



Ford Foundation

INDONESIA AND DISPLACEMENT

A set of three papers

Forced internal displacement: the Madurese in West Kalimantan, Indonesia

Sukamdi, Agus Dwiyanto Setiadi and Henry Sembiring
*Centre for Population and Policy Studies
Gadjah Mada University
Yogyakarta
Indonesia*

An appraisal of the case study on Forced internal displacement: the Madurese in West Kalimantan, Indonesia

Cynthia L Hunter
*Macquarie University
Sydney*

Political violence and migration: Recent Acehnese migration to Malaysia

Diana Wong and Teuku Afrisal
*Institute of Malaysian and International Studies
National University of Malaysia*

A Ford Foundation funded project

June 2002



Forced internal displacement: the Madurese in West Kalimantan, Indonesia

Contents

1. Introduction	3
1.1 Background	3
1.2 Problems to be investigated	6
1.3 Literature review	7
1.4 Research methods	10
1.5 Expected outcomes	10
2. The research area	10
3. History and sources of conflict	16
3.1 The Malay community in the Sambas district	16
3.2 The Dayak community in the Sambas district	16
3.3 The Madurese community in the Sambas district	16
3.4 Initial causes of misunderstanding	17
3.5 Problems arising in IDP camps	20
3.5.1 Economic problems	21
3.5.2 Social problems	21
3.5.3 Cultural problems	23
4. The government's response to IDP problems	23
4.1 National policies and strategies	23
4.2 The rescue period	24
4.3 The relocation period	25
4.4 Reconciliation	34
4.5 Bureaucratic aspects of handling IDP problems	35
5. Conclusion and policy suggestions	37
5.1 Re-count of IDPs	37
5.2 Transparency of information	37
5.3 Maintenance of law and order	38
5.4 Promotion of more effective dialogue	38
5.5 The role of central government	38

References 39

1. Introduction

1.1 Background

The problem of internally displaced people (IDPs) has become increasingly serious in the developing world, especially Indonesia. With more than one million IDPs, Indonesia is near the top of the list of countries experiencing displacement crises. Since the falling of the New Order era in 1998, the problem of displaced persons has emerged as a result of communal and sectarian conflict in various parts of Indonesia. Statistics demonstrate that between January and August 2001, the number of people accommodated in mostly makeshift IDP camps swelled from 1,038,276 to 1,305,886. In addition, the unstable economic and socio-political conditions since the crisis era have affected the government's ability to tackle the problems.

There is an indication that the problems faced by IDPs are becoming more complex. Public utilities, housing, food and basic amenities are the main problems they face, but most IDPs also suffer from 'post-traumatic stress', with little hope of regaining their property, livelihood or even members of their family. With increasing numbers of IDPs in the cities, all these issues are likely lead to social and even political problems.

According to the action program developed at the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, the issue of protection, especially towards women, children and the elderly, should be addressed in order to handle the problem of refugees¹ and IDPs.² The program should also seek solutions that might avert the causes of a perpetual refugee crises, with the objective of taking some preventive action in future. In addition, the action program should aim at enabling displaced persons to return to their original settlements.

In many countries, the refugee or IDP problems (whether in the context of refugees in designated places like camps or simply displaced people) are multidimensional, with political, economic, and socio-cultural dimensions. Politically, it might be an inter-territorial (international) conflict or one between differing interest groups within a particular country, a military coup or civil war or conflict. In most instances, the political factor is generally identified as the major cause of a displacement crisis, which sparks off a wave of refugees from one country to another in search of political asylum. Economically, the refugee problem is usually related to the economic consequences of drought and floods. Socio-culturally, the causes of refugee crises are mostly due to a disharmonious relationship between an ethnic majority and minority coexisting within the same area. The most striking examples are the problems experienced in Yugoslavia between ethnic Serbians and ethnic Bosnians, and in Rwanda between ethnic Hutus and ethnic Tutsis.

¹ The Geneva Convention 1951 defined a refugee as: 'Any person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or owing to fear is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable, or having such fear is unwilling, to return to it'. In 1969, a convention of the Organisation of African Unity extended the definition to include as reasons for refugee status: 'External aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or whole of country'. This applied only to African countries that signed this definition. The Cartagena Declaration of 1984 broadened the scope of the refugee declaration in a similar manner for countries in Latin America.

² IDPs are defined as: 'Person or groups of persons who have been forced to flee, or leave, their homes or places of habitual residence as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, and habitual violations of human rights, as well as natural or man-made disasters involving one or more of these elements, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised state border'.

It should be noted that a distinction between displaced people and refugees is inexact, ambiguous and deceptive. This is because the existence of displaced people is a transitional condition leading towards a refugee crisis. That aside, the refugee problem in many instances calls for the involvement of various countries and international organisations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). No matter where a refugee problem exists, it is never sufficient for it to be addressed by a single nation only.

In the Indonesian context, the trend of the IDP problem is registering a shift. Initially, this problem arose as a consequence of the process of development, particularly with various physical developments such as the construction of hydroelectric dams. These developments became a major cause of IDP and other social problems. A number of examples can be cited where physical development triggered a large wave of refugees, or large population movements between places, both voluntarily and involuntarily. Among these examples of development are Kedung Ombo in Boyolali, Gajah Mungkur in Wonogiri and Mrica in Banjarnegara (all located in Central Java). These three dam construction developments are representative of other similar developments that have caused large population movements under both voluntary and forced terms (Stanley 1994). Available data indicate that the Kedung Ombo project in Boyolali alone displaced about 30,000 people, who became the direct responsibility of the government of Indonesia. To date, this relocation problem has never been entirely resolved.

It is apparent that the IDP problem that emerged during the New Order period was mainly a consequence of development policy. Throughout this period (1967-1998), the displaced person problem mainly reflected the difference between government and community desires. Whilst the government was endeavouring to enforce a development program for community benefit, the community was endeavouring to conserve what they deemed theirs by birthright. Unlike during the New Order era, the IDP problem during the post New Order period has occurred as a result of conflicts that are mostly socially, religiously and racially motivated. This is a consequence of the foundation laid by the former government, which created a very fragile condition within the community with fertile ground for the eruption of conflict. For example, its tough approach towards social differences and its constant striving towards homogeneity actually sowed the seeds of discord and became the basis of a very complex social problem.

Today, there has been a rapid succession of governments within a very short span of time, from the Habibie era to Gus Dur and ultimately to Megawati. The three governments have not yet been able to eradicate the existence of IDP problems. Indeed, there are indications that IDP problems in the country are on the increase. The problem is expanding because the number of affected areas is increasing and more groups are involved.

The political dimension of this crisis is demonstrated by the weakening control of central government over local government. There is a growing indication of motivation towards localised separatism as a direct consequence of misinterpretation of the meaning and intention of the central government's regional autonomy policy. Many regions have seen regional autonomy as an opportunity to establish some sort of governance that is exclusively focused on narrower regional matters, ignoring wider public issues such as the problems created by IDPs. This development exacerbates the displaced person problem, with regions that are home to IDPs tending to downplay the whole problem.

Research data show that an attitude is growing in various areas to ignore IDP problems, which, according to those in control of the regions, are the responsibility of central government. This is vividly evident from the way in which cases of ex-displaced persons from East Timor are handled. This attitude is often closely linked with the strong feeling that indigenous people in their home place must get top priority for any opportunity that arises. This has often led to the emergence of vertical conflict between central and local government. With regard to the population resettlement of

IDPs or similar programs, the regions are more interested in policies that support a kind of closed society.

Second, the complexity associated with the IDP problem has also arisen as a result of the sentimental motivation of anti-pluralism. There is strong evidence that anti-pluralist feeling in various regions is the major motivating factor in every conflict that arises. This has led to the emergence of various movements that take advantage of primordial symbols like religion and ethnicity, which are used quite exclusively. This has been vividly demonstrated in the form of a massacre of ethnic Madurese people in West Kalimantan, civil war between Muslims and Christians in Maluku and North Maluku, riots in Mataram (Lombok) and separatist independence movements in various areas such as Aceh, Papua and Riau (Pusat Studi Kependudukan dan Kebijakan 2000).

Violent conflicts in these areas have led to a sharp increase in the wave of IDPs to various places in Indonesia or elsewhere. The socio-political conditions that are widely manifested through political violence, religious sentiments, race and other primordial symbols have made the IDP problem increasingly complex. It has now become a chronic humanitarian problem. The human exodus from affected areas like East Timor, East Nusa Tenggara or Aceh cannot be taken care of in a systematic manner, but instead the immediate focus is directed at other more pressing humanitarian problems.

Efforts to handle IDP problems are further complicated by the desire of local communities to emphasise ethnic, religious and racial factors as preconditions to the resettlement of displaced persons in their areas. These preconditions seriously conflict with humanitarian principles and the existence of a pluralistic community in Indonesia. In view of this complexity, there is an urgent need for intensive discussion in an effort to construct a concrete policy to address IDP problems in the context of multiethnic relationships in Indonesia. This discussion must be based on the universal principles of handling IDP problems and must also be in line with local community objectives.

By the end of 2000, an estimated 750,000 to 850,000 Indonesians were internally displaced in 18 of Indonesia's 26 provinces. These include 215,000 to 285,000 people in Maluku, 207,000 in North Maluku, 110,000 to 130,000 in Southeast Sulawesi, 73,000 in Central Sulawesi, 60,000 to 70,000 in West Kalimantan, 36,000 in North Sulawesi, 30,000 in North Sumatra, 20,000 in Java, 17,000 in Irian Jaya (West Papua), 15,000 in South Sulawesi and at least 8,000 in Aceh. Thousands more were displaced elsewhere in Sumatra and on the islands of Nusa Tenggara. By August 2001, the estimated total number had increased to 1,305,886 — the distribution is shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Number of displaced persons, August 2001

No	Province	Families involved	Number of people	Region of origin
1	Aceh	10,377	41,508	Aceh
2	North Sumatra	9,350	44,998	Aceh
3	Riau	762	3,135	Aceh
4	Jambi	519	2,103	Aceh
5	South Sumatra	425	1,700	Aceh
6	West Java	2,363	9,275	Aceh, Maluku, Irian, West Kalimantan
7	Central Java	2,788	11,799	Aceh, Maluku, East Timor West Kalimantan Irian
8	East Java	40,961	165,732	Maluku, Irian West Kalimantan Central Kalimantan
9	Bali	751	2,974	East Timor
10	West Nusa Tenggara	3,078	14,166	Irian, Maluku East Timor, West Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi
11	East Nusa Tenggara	29,178	143,803	East Timor
12	West Kalimantan	11,255	58,544	West Kalimantan
13	South Sulawesi	9,023	36,104	East Timor
14	North Sulawesi	11,945	47,780	Maluku North Maluku Central Sulawesi
15	S.E. Sulawesi	32,513	161,226	East Timor, Maluku, Central Sulawesi, W Kalimantan
16	Central Sulawesi	19,507	78,030	Central Sulawesi
17	Maluku	51,551	300,091	Maluku
18	North Maluku	33,268	166,318	North Maluku
19	Irian Jaya	4,027	16,600	Maluku, North Maluku, Irian
Total		273,641	1,305,886	

Source: *The Jakarta Post* (2001).

Another estimate puts the total number of IDPs at 286,944 families or 1,337,503 people, covering 20 provinces. These figures are based on reports of governors in their capacity as heads of the executive coordinating unit for disaster management and the handling of IDPs (Pemerintah Propinsi Kalimantan Barat 2001). The number is changing all the time and tends to increase.

These figures include the East Timorese people, who were displaced by violent destruction caused by a combination of civil riots, civil troops (*Milisi*) pro-Indonesia and some Indonesian troops and military after the territory overwhelmingly voted for independence from Indonesia in August 1999. Only the East Timorese are officially considered to be refugees by the United Nations, entitling them to international assistance, much of which (up to 60%, according to some reports) is diverted by Indonesian officials. The others, victims of sectarian and civil wars in Aceh, Maluku, North Maluku, Central Sulawesi, Central Kalimantan, West Kalimantan and Irian Jaya (West Papua), are considered to be 'internally displaced people', putting the burden of supporting them solely on the Indonesian government. This research is focused on IDPs in West Kalimantan.

1.2 Problems to be investigated

There are currently four main problems in dealing with the increasing number of IDPs in Indonesia, including those in West Kalimantan. First, the IDP problem is not only a humanitarian issue, but is linked to political, economic, social, cultural, religious and security affairs at both local and national

level. Second, from observation and preliminary analysis using mass media, the main problems appear to be disharmony and lack of coordination among government officials on one hand, and also between them and national and international organisations. Third, there can be jealousy and dissatisfaction between IDPs and local communities, caused by a feeling of injustice, and this tends to create new problems and conflicts. Fourth, a considerable amount of funding has so far been disbursed, along with time and energy, and this could be used to help other poor communities.

The trend towards the escalation of mass violence in various regions across Indonesia, most notably in Sambas, West Kalimantan (the focus of this research) has developed so rapidly that it has engulfed other regions and become increasingly difficult to control. A more detailed observation will reveal that the emergence of disorder and violence in a particular community is an indicator of the damage or destruction of social accommodation processes, which constitute the basis of multiethnic community integration in Indonesia. This symptom is an unmistakable reflection of a very significant problem, the problem of social disintegration. Social disintegration threatens the existence of community instinct, and can create a loss of allegiance and loyalty of a group of people towards the state, loss of association or communal solidarity, and can even create loss of loyalty to an existing social system. The simplest example is the ineffectiveness or failure to solve existing problems in a traditional manner in various conflict areas because the tradition itself has lost meaning and is no longer essential to its previous supporters.

This twist of events is a strong signal that must be closely observed because the social processes that have been taking place in a number of regions in Indonesia, if not seriously addressed, will inevitably bring about the undesirable consequences of a wider social disintegration process. Addressing the problem of disintegration is the key to solving wider social problems in Indonesia, and one way to do this is to study current IDP problems. There is, therefore, a need for research that specifically addresses the phenomenon of mass violence by taking a particular case study in order to gain a satisfactory understanding of this phenomenon. By doing so, a deeper understanding of the basis of the problem, especially its main causes, can be obtained in order to formulate appropriate policy.

In view of this situation, detailed discussion regarding the IDP problem is necessary in order to formulate policy that can adequately address this complex issue, including how best the occurrence of conflict can be minimised in regions where fragile relationships exist between communities. The high potential for the outbreak of conflict that can disrupt national objectives can thus hopefully be reduced. The questions that this research will endeavour to answer are:

1. What problems arise as a consequence of the existence of IDPs, and what policies must be implemented in order to solve these problems?
2. What political, economic, social and cultural constraints complicate the implementation of policies directed at addressing these IDP problems?

1.3 Literature review

When considering IDP problems in Indonesia over the last five years, it must be noted that the country has been shaken by various open and violent social conflicts causing thousands of deaths and injuries, as well as destruction of property. The most notable incidences causing significant waves of IDPs include: the conflict in Sanggau Ledo on 30 December 1996; the one from 28–31 January 1997 which involved the mass migration of ethnic Madurese people to Pontianak; in Jakarta from 13–15 May 1998 involving the mass migration of ethnic Chinese; in Sambas between 18 January and 26 April 1999 which also involved displacement of ethnic Madurese people to Pontianak; in Sampit and Palangkaraya from 18 February 2001 which involved the migration of

ethnic Madurese people to Java; and lastly, the conflicts in Ambon and Maluku which have caused a large number of displaced persons to migrate to South Sulawesi, Java and other islands.

From a historical perspective, the IDP problem in Indonesia has taken shape and gradually deteriorated into a real problem since the 1970s, when the government initiated a number of development policies that included the construction of various dams in a number of provinces in Java. This is not to suggest, however, that there were no movements of displaced persons before then. Rather, during the 1970s, the IDP problem became explosive, drawing attention not only at the national but also the international level. The development of the Gajah Mungkur dam in Central Java, for instance, led to the displacement and eventual migration of people from 51 villages between 1978 and 1992. Many people lost their right to own property following the development of the Mrica dam in Banjarnegara and Kedung Ombo in Sragen. The development of the Kedung Ombo project alone led to the displacement of 30,000 people (Stanley 1994). The problems associated with the development of dams attracted considerable international attention (Aditjondro 1994). Other available data indicate that more than 45,000 people were displaced as a consequence of the development of dams in Indonesia (Cernea 1990).

At the end of the 1990s, the IDP situation in three areas in Indonesia — Ambon, East Timor and West Pontianak — attracted substantial attention (Duffield and Young 1999). These three areas in particular created a very complex social and humanitarian problem. It is said that the violence between Muslims and non-Muslims in Ambon has changed life there and has led to forced migration on an unprecedented scale. Generally, non-Muslims were forced to migrate out of Ambon. The violence that took place in East Timor amounted to gross violation of human rights, widely believed to have been orchestrated by military personnel. In Pontianak, the violence between ethnic Dayak and Malay Sambas on one hand, and against ethnic Madurese people, led to an explosive IDP crisis involving the movement of more than 30,000 Madurese people (as well as thousands of deaths). Other sources put the total number of people affected by this crisis as high as 65,000 (Pemerintah Propinsi Kalimantan Barat 2001).

The typology of the causes of conflict and IDP crises in Indonesia can therefore be divided into two broad periods. The first period was during the New Order regime. Conflict in society and the IDP problem were negative consequences of the development process during this period, particularly the construction of dams to generate electricity and irrigation and to control floods. During this period, the solution that was frequently offered to the affected people (sometimes forcefully) was relocation in designated transmigration areas outside the island of Java. During the post New Order period, or more precisely, the Reform era (with three different governments — B.J. Habibie, Gus Dur and Megawati), the IDP problem arose mainly as a consequence of ethnic conflict based on tribe, religion and race.

The Reform government is even less able to handle the IDP problem than the New Order regime. It can be said that the current government has no clear vision about IDP problems and just acts spontaneously, instead of taking planned action to address IDP problems and related conflicts. This is mainly due to various weaknesses associated with the government, which include the fact that the Reform government is not as strong as the preceding government, so that forceful means of conflict resolution cannot be applied with any success. In addition the timing is unfortunate, as the present government is often confronted by instability.

The complex conditions regarding IDP problems give rise to many other problems. These include social, health and humanitarian problems. Apart from a shortage of food supplies, a wider problem is poor health conditions. It is apparent, however, that the current IDP problem is particularly complex because it has a very strong element of ethnic conflict. Every time there is an effort to repatriate and resettle IDPs in other areas as a result of ethnic conflict, many obstacles arise — some from the IDP population itself and some from non-displaced persons. The IDPs generally prefer to be resettled with people who have similar ethnic, religious and racial characteristics as

them. This means that the IDP problem arising as a consequence of ethnic conflict is more difficult to solve. The transfer of such people generally causes instability in the area of origin. There are also a number of constraints in terms of the relationship between native and displaced persons. These include prejudice and a stereotype of negative attitude towards IDPs. In most cases the native people have a tendency to reject the IDPs living in their area.

In view of this situation, and increasing awareness of the fact that policies on IDPs are not yet clear, it is reasonable for an intensive case study on this issue to be carried out. Problems with IDPs in Pontianak have continued to occur repeatedly over a period of time. Furthermore, in the context of Indonesian society today, where communities tend to associate with groups with similar ethnic, religious and racial similarities, and where there is a strong motivation of regionalism, the IDP problem arising out of ethnic conflict is particularly relevant for discussion. Without an exact and comprehensive understanding of the IDP problem in Indonesia, there is the danger of a deeper conflict and a pending humanitarian tragedy in a nation that is struggling to transform its institutions into a modern democracy.

In theory, efforts to address the problem of ethnic conflict can be mapped into three broad perspectives. First, there is the group that believes that mass violence between ethnic groups occurs as a consequence of cultural clash. Lack of harmony between two cultures is believed to create a very fragile condition that is fertile for an outburst of mass conflict between ethnic groups. The violence in Sambas in 1999 (which involved the Madurese ethnic community, as did the cases of Sampit and Palangkaraya in 2001) is strongly believed to have resulted from the failure of the Madurese people to adopt the culture of West Kalimantan, as ethnic Madurese are still deeply rooted in the traditions of their area of origin. They have a very exclusive attitude in terms of relating with others, which makes it difficult for them to become accustomed to other cultures (Alqadrie 1999).

The second view is that the underlying cause of inter-communal violence can best be explained using an economic-political approach. Here, conflict is perceived to be a result of interaction between political and economic forces at the national and local level, which together lead to the marginalisation of the economic base of the local community. This then creates an attitude of resistance from the local community towards the national institutions and the capital. Open conflict between ethnic groups is therefore a reflection of resistance or opposition towards the economic and political structures that they believe to be oppressing them (Pusat Penelitian Pembangunan Pedesaan dan Kawasan 1998).

Third, economic inequality can cause a kind of social jealousy between the original community and the immigrants (Santoso 1999). In the case of a very competitive market economy, a successful person believes that inequality is something normal whereas unsuccessful people look at it as gross unfairness and injustice.

This research endeavours to address this problem from the three perspectives outlined above. Our effort is directed at a more comprehensive understanding of these viewpoints, in order to comprehend the underlying phenomenon associated with mass violence between ethnic groups in Sambas. There are of course social, cultural, economic and political conditions that play a substantial role in provoking such violence.

First, there is the perception that inequality in access to economic and political resources exists between tribes and other social groups within the community. These differences in access to and power over economic resources, whether perceived or real, are often interpreted as a consequence of the establishment of domination or hegemony by one tribe over other tribes in the society. Second, is the emergence of a feeling of dissatisfaction, frustration, ill feeling, *Sinicisme* and distrust towards existing social and political institutions by some elements in the community. One crucial aspect, which is a direct consequence of the ongoing reform process, is the strong distrust

by some parts of the community towards various government institutions. In such circumstances, any effort directed at solving inter-communal conflict and IDP problems, however well-intentioned, will often attract a negative response because of this existing prejudice.

Due to the fact that the two issues outlined above have not been well handled by government authorities, the inevitable impact has been more uncertainty about the solution to IDP problems in various areas in Indonesia. The complexity, in terms of language, religion, social strata, race and culture within a community or tribe, is recognised but not treated as an important factor in solving problems in society. It is therefore apparent that social conditions in Indonesia are very fragile. Indonesia, with all its diversity, was born out of a motivation of unity as a nation after a bitter history of colonial oppression by Western Europe, but is now being seriously threatened by the same diversity.

At the policy level, the repeated outbreak of conflict in Indonesia clearly reflects the fact that the government has not been able to address the problem of conflict in the most appropriate manner. Lack of experience at the government level to handle problems associated with conflict and IDPs places discussion about these issues at a strategic point, and reinforces the need for this research about the ethnic conflict in Pontianak.

1.4 Research methods

West Kalimantan has been selected as the area for this research since the conflict at the root of IDP problems has a long history. In addition, there were safety considerations in Maluku, Poso and Aceh. This research is based mainly on a qualitative approach. Data collection was undertaken using in-depth interviews with three types of informants: local government officials, informal leaders and IDPs. The local government officials were mainly from institutions that are directly involved in handling the displaced persons, including policemen. Informal leaders came from amongst religious leaders and leaders of three ethnic groups — Malay, Dayak and Madurese — both within and outside the camp. The IDP informants were Madurese people.

Three researchers were involved in the collection of data — two from the Centre for Population and Policy Studies, Gadjah Mada University and one from a local university, the University of Tanjungpura, West Kalimantan. In addition, one guide helped the researchers to collect data, particularly in terms of approaching people from a different ethnic group.

1.5 Expected outcomes

This discussion is expected to formulate a policy model for handling IDP problems that might minimise the occurrence of new conflict. It is hoped that the study will become a model for discussion that can be applied to further research in various other provinces in Indonesia. More specifically, an understanding will be developed of the policy strategy that the government has been pursuing in addressing the IDP problem, of constraints to implementation of this policy, of the responses and aspirations of the local communities and of problems faced by displaced persons in temporary camps. It is hoped, therefore, that this study will produce appropriate policy recommendations.

2. The research area

The province of West Kalimantan is one of four provinces on Kalimantan Island and has an area of 146,807 km², comprising six districts and one municipality. Smaller administrative divisions in this province comprise 124 sub-districts and 1,403 villages and *kelurahan*. The total population in 1990 was 2,592,377 people, with an annual population growth of 2.29 per cent in the period 1980-1990

(Central Bureau of Statistics, Jakarta 1991). In the period 1990-2000, the population growth rate decreased to 1.53 per cent annually, with a total population of 3,740,017 in 2000. Population by district is shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Population distribution in West Kalimantan by district in 2000

No	District	Sex		Total
		Male	Female	
1	Sambas	225,255	224,529	449,784
2	Bengkoyang	172,164	164,313	336,477
3	Landak	146,208	135,475	281,683
4	Pontianak	317,421	311,391	628,812
5	Sanggau	257,570	244,756	502,326
6	Ketapang	218,966	206,178	425,144
7	Sintang	235,136	224,832	459,968
8	Kapuas Hulu	92,782	90,041	182,823
9	Kodia Pontianak	237,805	235,195	473,000
Total		1,903,307	1,836,710	3,740,017*

* This figure includes people who are hunter gatherers.

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Jakarta (2001).


In the year 2000 the population density in West Kalimantan was very low — 26 people per km² compared to 106 in Indonesia as a whole. In addition to the low population density, income inequality is relatively high, with a moderate level of poverty and unbalanced spatial development (Siahaan and Daroesman 1991). Geographically, West Kalimantan is very swampy and is crossed by many large and small rivers. This means that transport and communication networks are concentrated in certain areas, especially along the western coast towards Sarawak in East Malaysia. About 50 per cent of all roads in West Kalimantan are concentrated in the district of Pontianak and Pontianak town, both of which constitute only 30 per cent of the total area of the province. The eastern part of the province is very remote, with almost no road network connecting it to the areas of vibrant economic activity in other parts of the province, let alone to other provinces on the island of Kalimantan. This has inevitably resulted in uneven population distribution, with the highest population concentration in towns (the provincial and district headquarters), along the roads connecting the towns in the province and along the banks of the big rivers. The latter is a consequence of the important role played by rivers in the transport system in the province.

West Kalimantan Province is bordered to the north by East Malaysia (Sarawak), to the east by East Kalimantan Province, to the south by the Java Sea, and to the west by the South China Sea and Karimata Strait. The province, which is crossed by the equator, enjoys a tropical climate with an average maximum temperature of 27.4 degrees Celsius and a minimum average of 26 degrees Celsius.

The fact that much of this province comprises swamps means that it is not suitable for agriculture. With most swamps supplied by various large and small rivers, water transport is more developed than overland roads. Transport between different areas is mostly via water. Many harbours have therefore been developed in the province, such as Pontianak harbour, Teluk Air harbour, Ketapang harbour, Singkawang harbour, Sambas harbour and Sintete harbour. The types of water transport used in the area include *kapal bandung* (a kind of wooden boat in the form of a house, complete with a roof), motor boats, *tongkang*, tugboats, tankers, water buses, ferries, longboats and speedboats.

Population growth in West Kalimantan has mostly resulted from immigration, in particular the transmigration program. As an illustration, the total number of transmigrants entering West Kalimantan from 1971–79 was 22,665 people, whereas from 1980–85 the number was 115,782. There was an increase in population of 93,117 people, or 410.8 per cent, over that five-year period. Table 3 shows transmigration figures by district from 1965–1985.

Map showing location of West Kalimantan Province



A Melanau
 B Lun Dayeh
 C Dayak Darat
 D Bugis
 E Melayu
 F Kadazan
 G Kedayan
 H Banjar
 I Kelabit

J Bajau
 K Murut
 L Maloh
 M Desa
 N Taman
 O Tebidah
 P Kantu
 Q Limbau
 R Kenyah/Kayan

S Modang
 T Tunjung
 U Ot Danun
 V Nglaju
 W Ma'anyah dan Lawangan
 X Iban
 Z Cina

Table 3: Transmigration to West Kalimantan, 1965–1985

District	1965–1978	1979–1984	1983–1985
Pontianak	15,518	2,450	4,568
Sambas	0	3,056	3,256
Sanggau	0	4,750	4,307
Sintang	0	14,977	5,739
Kapuas Hulu	0	0	4,079
Ketapang	0	2,104	3,672
Total	15,518	27,337	25,621

Source: Pulo Siahaan and Ruth Daroesman (1991, p. 533).

Another factor that has caused high population growth in West Kalimantan is the establishment of palm oil plantations and the subsequent growth of the palm oil industry (PNP VII). Development of plantations for palm oil is concentrated in the districts of Sanggau and Sintang, for rubber in the districts of Pontianak and Sambas, while other plantations such as oranges and *lada* are spread across various districts.

Although accurate information on the ethnic composition of the population is not available, Pontianak probably has the highest concentration of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. This can mainly be attributed to historical migration patterns and rural upheavals in this province during the 1960s. The two smallest districts — Pontianak and Sambas — with the worst record of ethnic conflict have the largest number of people, reinforced by migration patterns (Siahaan and Daroesman 1991). Population density here is as much as 10 times higher than that of the other three remote and sparsely settled districts of Sintang, Kapuas Hulu and Ketapang. During the 1960s, population growth was uniform except for the much higher and lower rates recorded in the city and district of Pontianak respectively. The factor influencing this pattern was probably the evacuation of the Chinese. Since 1971, however, these two regions have grown far more rapidly than the province as a whole, and the main cause appears to be the government's transmigration program.

Although the transmigration program has been in existence for a long time, it has not been successful everywhere it has been implemented. This is mostly due to the infertile nature of the land. The 'transmigration' location of Rasau Jaya is an example of such a program failure. This research indicates that as a consequence of declining land fertility, many transmigrants have been forced to seek an alternative means of livelihood or to open up new areas, particularly along riverbanks, for agricultural purposes. Studies of these transmigration areas or units indicate that they have been settled since 1971/72. The failure to maintain land fertility has forced transmigrants from various units to look for more fertile places to cultivate (Faculty of Geography and Agriculture, Gadjah Mada University 1979, p. 48). Basically, mass emigration from Java to West Kalimantan has been an ongoing process since the 1950s, mostly because of the River Durian, Olak-olak Kubu and River Kakap. Migration figures show that a large number of migrants to West Kalimantan (59.6 per cent) are farmers cultivating between 0.5 ha and 2.25 ha of land, whilst 46.28 per cent are casual labourers and office workers. Their areas of origin show that a large number of them came from Java. In all, only 4.85 per cent gave transmigration as their main reason for moving (Centre for Population Studies, Gadjah Mada University 1987/1988).

This study has shown that the failure by transmigrants to maintain soil fertility on the land they cultivate has forced them to open up new areas for agriculture. Unfortunately, no further clarification is available as to when these new areas were cleared, or whether the transmigrants gained approval for their activities with government authorities, local clan leaders of other tribes or other responsible authorities. Such a process had the potential to isolate the indigenous community, who were replaced by transmigrants or perhaps even new spontaneous migrants.

Various research studies indicate that the large number of immigrants has drastically transformed the socio-cultural composition of West Kalimantan into a completely multicultural one. Whilst the more remote areas of the province are mostly populated by ethnic Dayak communities, the coastal areas are dominated by Malay, Banjar, Bugis, Javanese and Madurese people (Singarimbun 1992). Others are the Bataks and Sundanese. According to Sellato (in Singarimbun 1992), about 90 per cent of the Malay people in Kalimantan are descendants of the Dayak. There is some interesting information closely related to this fact: members of the Dayak community who have converted to Islam are widely perceived to have 'become Malay'. It is therefore apparent that the Malay and the Dayak, particularly in West Kalimantan, are genealogically very closely related. A person who has become a Malay, and who still believes in his original religion or even Christianity for that matter, will be treated as a visitor in the Dayak community (Singarimbun 1992).

The Dayak ethnic group that inhabits the more remote areas of West Kalimantan comprises various ethnic subgroups, such as the Kanayatan Dayak, the Iban Dayak and the Taman Dayak. Like other large ethnic groups, the Dayak, who are mostly identified with the island of Kalimantan, are a tribe that consists of various other sub-tribes with very diverse lifestyles. The Dayak can be categorised into six broad subgroups or tribes: the Kenyah, Kayan and Bahau, who live in East Kalimantan; the Ot-Danum, who are predominantly settled in Central Kalimantan; the Kelemantan, who live in West Kalimantan; the Iban, who inhabit the Sarawak region in East Malaysia; the Murut, who are settled in the Sabah area in East and North Malaysia, in East Kalimantan; and the Punan or small tribes, spread across remote Kalimantan. Ch.F.H.Duman categorises these Dayak tribes as shown in Table 4.

Table 4: Division of the Dayak tribe into smaller sub-tribes

No	Main tribe	Sub-tribe	Total number of small sub-tribes
1	Dayak Ngaju	Ngaju	53
		Maanyan	7
		Lawangan	31
		Dusun	8
	Dayak Apu Kayan	Kenyah	24
		Kayan	10
		Bakau	26
	Dayak Iban	Iban	11
	Dayak Kelementan	Darat	47
		ketungau	39
	Dayak Murut	Murut	20
		Idaan/Dusun	6
		Tindung	10
	Dayak Punan	Basap	20
		At	5
		Punan	24
		Dayak Bukat	
	Dayak Ot-Danum	Ot-Danum	66

Source: Yusnono (1992).

The Malay ethnic groups, on the other hand, are comprised of the Malay Pontianak, Malay Sambas, Malay Ketapang, Malay Landak and others, while the Chinese ethnic groups consist of the Hakka (Khek) and Tewcu (Hoklo) subgroups. Looking at the main occupations of the various tribes in Kalimantan, the Dayak are mostly engaged in farming (agricultural) activities. The Malay people are engaged in agriculture and fishing, while some of them also participate in trading activities. Most of the Chinese are traders (Akil 1994: 186-188). The largest ethnic groups in West

Kalimantan are the Dayak, the Malay and the Chinese. Their numbers in 1992 are presented in Table 5.

Table 5: Composition of ethnic groups in West Kalimantan, 1992

Tribe	Total	Percentage
Dayak	1,323,510	41.00
Malay	1,227,349	39.57
Chinese	365,740	11.33
Others	261,479	8.10
Total	3,178,078	100.00

Source: Parjoko (1992).

From a macro point of view, the Dayak is the largest tribe compared with others, but they constitute the minority among urban residents. Most of the Dayak people in Kalimantan live in rural areas, which is synonymous with an agricultural lifestyle, cultivation of the land and hunting. The pattern of life in urban areas is predominantly a commercial lifestyle, including the service sector. The composition of Pontianak municipality by ethnic background is presented in Table 6.

Table 6: Ethnic composition of Pontianak municipality in 1990, by percentage

Ethnic groups	Percentage
Malay	33.00
Chinese	31.00
Dayak	2.00
Others	32.00
Total	100

Source: Akil (1994).

It is evident from the table above that ethnic Dayak constitute just two per cent of the urban population. Malay, Chinese and other ethnic groups are dominant in urban centres. A fact that is very curious is the location of the Madurese people. This tribe is a focus of attention, mainly because most of the ethnic conflicts that take place in Kalimantan involve ethnic Madurese people on one hand and other tribes (Malay and Dayak) on the other.

Secondary data on the whereabouts of ethnic Madurese people are not available. However, from interviews and observations in the field during the course of this research it became apparent that the Madurese people neither have a specific location of residence, nor are they identified with a specific lifestyle. They are widely spread from the coast to remote areas. Although their total population is not known with certainty, it can nevertheless be estimated that the number is significant and their role in the economic system is also very important. At the ports or harbours, the number of entrepreneurs of ethnic Madurese origin operating passenger transport boats is considerable. In urban areas, they dominate small-scale trade and commerce, and are employed as casual labourers and construction workers as well. This is largely because other ethnic groups in West Kalimantan tend to avoid employment in such laborious activities. In rural areas, the Madurese people generally live as farmers or cultivators and they also raise livestock. The Madurese are known to be very industrious and hardworking in every aspect of life, and tend to live exclusively in their own groups.

West Kalimantan is unique in several ways compared with other provinces of Indonesia. Siahaan and Daroesman (1991) point out that this province has a long and relatively well-traversed international land boundary with Sarawak (East Malaysia). It is also one of the least densely populated provinces, resulting in part from its poor resource base. It has relatively high incomes and

high inequality, but only a moderate level of poverty, and, above all, it is characterised by uneven spatial development.

3. History and sources of conflict

The area of conflict that has the largest number of IDPs, and has undergone a subsequent emergence of IDP camps of ethnic Madurese people, is the district of Sambas. The Sambas district is a predominantly agrarian region of 12,296 km², with a total population of 895,900 people spread over 19 sub-districts and an average population density of 73 persons/km². The population in the district of Sambas consists of various ethnic groups including Malay, Dayak, Chinese, Madurese, Batak, Bugis, Javanese and Sundanese. The first four of these comprise the greatest number of residents in the district in the following proportions: Malay — 47 per cent, Dayak — 28 per cent, Chinese — 11 per cent and Madurese — 9.4 per cent.

The history of conflict in Sambas is very closely related to the history of immigration into the district. This study will examine the history of immigration by ethnic Malay, Dayak and Madurese people into the Sambas district.

3.1 The Malay community in the Sambas district

The Malay community originated from the Malaka Strait. They have settled along riverbanks, in coastal areas and a small number of them live in villages. They often settle clustered in groups. The main occupation of this ethnic group is fundamentally different from other ethnic groups in Kalimantan, who are generally traders and farmers. Most of the Malay people in Sambas are Muslims.

The Malay people are obedient, religious, culturally-oriented, shy, proud about their language and culture and not easily influenced by any form of provocation. They have a very high sense of collective responsibility (*gotong royong*). Their solidarity as a community is also very high. They are known to be hardworking, patient and not easily angered. When they are angry about something, they do not show it openly. Instead they use parables to express their dissatisfaction and annoyance.

3.2. The Dayak community in the Sambas district

The Dayak are the indigenous people of the island of Kalimantan and are spread across all four provinces on the island, as well as into parts of Malaysia and Brunei. They live a nomadic kind of life, wandering from place to place. The Dayak are not a single ethnic group but comprise various ethnic subgroups with a diversity of customs (see the preceding section). There are marked differences in customs between the subgroups although there are also various similarities. The most basic characteristic similar to all Dayak ethnic groups is that they are an oral community with an integral relationship with the land — a community that has a strong belief that the world and everything in it was created by the Almighty. They have strong solidarity and loyalty among themselves, and a strong sense of communalism.

The ethnic Dayak are followers of various religions, including Christianity, Catholicism, Islam and Hinduism, and there are also those who still believe in animism. There is a high religious tolerance among Dayak people. They are known to be very patient but if their patience is overstretched, by way of perpetual unfair treatment or behaviour that makes them feel undermined or their customs despised, their reaction can be excessive and can easily deteriorate into anarchy and sadism.

3.3 The Madurese community in the Sambas district

There are two historical accounts that attempt to explain the immigration of ethnic Madurese people to the Sambas district. The first version holds that the Madurese people came to Kalimantan as early as the beginning of the 18th century. It maintains that the Madurese people came with the troops of the Mataram Kingdom under the rule of Sultan Agung, who came to assist the Sambas Kingdom in a war against the Kingdom of Riau. While in Sambas, some of them intermarried with local people and by the time the Mataram troops returned to Java, some decided to stay behind and settle permanently in Sambas. If this historical account is authentic, then it is logical that ethnic Madurese people describe the Sambas district as their second place of birth and have a historical legitimacy in believing that this region is still under the rule of the Mataram troops. This is the justification of their negative treatment of the indigenous people here (Alqadrie 1999).

The second version maintains that the ethnic Madurese people came to Sambas in the 20th century, shortly before and after Indonesia's national independence — a struggle that stretched from 1902 to 1950. The main motivating factor for voluntary as well as planned transmigration was to improve their social and economic life (Alqadrie 1999).

The hard environmental conditions in their area of origin (Madura Island) are believed to have influenced the *Watak* and personalities of the Madurese people. They are acknowledged as being generally hard, rough, tough, easily provoked, arrogant and assertive, although not all of them behave in this manner. As a consequence, the locals in Sambas label all ethnic Madurese with this negative brand. As immigrants in Sambas, they are generally employed in the informal sector as construction workers, sellers of vegetables and roasted chicken (*sate*), riders of *becak* and other labouring activities. This means they are seen as hardworking people who do not easily give up.

3.4 Initial causes of misunderstanding

Not all the ethnic Madurese living in the Sambas district display the characteristics often associated with Madurese people, such as being short-tempered or carrying weapons. Indeed, the later arrivals have a different temperament from those who migrated decades earlier. In general, ethnic Madurese people who have lived in the Sambas district for a long while, particularly those who have intermarried, have had their original arrogance and rough temperament eroded, and they now blend in well with the local community. In many instances, however, the pattern of settlement of ethnic Madurese people is characterised by solidarity among themselves and isolation from other ethnic groups. They show an exclusive solidarity that makes them very defensive of their community in the event of conflict with other communities, sometimes acting blindly without looking objectively towards the cause of the problem. Although just a few elements among the ethnic Madurese people behave in this way, the local communities view this behaviour as being characteristic of all ethnic Madurese.

The migration pattern of the Madurese community has also contributed significantly in helping the conflict to ferment. The ethnic Madurese in West Kalimantan generally enjoy a good standard of living in social, economic and cultural terms. Although in various interviews the Madurese people dismissed the charge that they like living among themselves, most informants contacted in rural areas confirmed that ethnic Madurese people have their own mosques.

In economic terms, the Madurese are known to be very diligent and hardworking, especially among the middle and low income groups, to the extent that they have been able to transform the local economy. They have done this mainly in areas of rough and tough work, such as stone quarrying, riding pedicabs, selling consumables on a roving basis and other rough activities in the informal sector that often constitute public service. Sometimes, however, they behave in an excessive and unfair manner, such as harvesting crops belonging to other tribes, or manipulating borders of farms

that they cultivate, for example, by extending into land belonging to other tribes. They also cultivate other tribes' land or build houses on land that does not belong to them on the basis that all land belongs to God. If problems arise out of such unfair acts, they respond with violence. Apart from all this, it is not uncommon for Madurese people to force Malay people to sell their land to them.

Over many decades, the Malay and Dayak people have developed a strong feeling that the Madurese people have been treating them with undue unfairness, yet the government authorities in charge of law and order have maintained a kind of 'blind eye diplomacy' towards this very serious problem. From information obtained from various informants in the field, there are indications that the Dayak and Malay people have developed a strong hatred towards the Madurese people. Indeed, there are indications that tribes other than the Dayak and the Malay also have a feeling of hatred towards the Madurese people.

The consequence of this discord was an accumulation of grievances and a strong desire for revenge. This continued oppression led to a formidable opposition that was unmistakably brutal. The Dayak and the Malay developed a parable: 'When it is small it belongs to the Malay, but when it is big it belongs to the Madurese'. The period after the brutal violence, which resulted in hundreds of thousands of displaced persons, led to the coining of a new parable: 'That hens can now lay eggs and coconuts can mature and drop from the tree on their own'. This parable portrays the patient nature of the Dayak and Malay.

It was explained earlier that ethnic Malay and Dayak people are very patient and have a high degree of self-restraint, although there is a limit beyond which they cannot be overstretched. Every conflict that arises is settled by involving community leaders from the conflicting tribes, who sit together to seek dialogue and common understanding, often followed by signing an agreement. Indeed, there is a very vivid symbol of peace and reconciliation in the form of a statue that is located in Samalantan. This was raised as a consequence of the bloody conflict that took place in the Samalantan sub-districts in 1979. It was agreed then that there should be respect and that people should always guard against violating the rights of other tribes. This Samalantan Agreement, as it came to be known, clearly pointed out that peace and reconciliation between the Madurese and the Dayak ethnic communities would be achieved only if the Madurese community kept the promise never to murder Dayak people again. But, according to some informants in the field, the Madurese people treated this agreement as a mere symbol. Worse still, most of the violations carried out by the Madurese people were not responded to with proportionate punitive measures by either security or government authorities.

The aggravation of conflict between ethnic Dayak-Madurese and Malay-Madurese in West Kalimantan, according to the Kalimantan Review (1999), was based on 11 cases. This culminated in the expulsion of ethnic Madurese people from the Sambas district. The first case dated back to 1952 and concerned the theft of property belonging to someone from the Dayak Simalantan tribe. The second case concerned the murder of Sani, sub-district head of Sei Punyuh in the village of Terap Toho in 1976; the third was another murder of Cangkeh in Sei Pinyuh in the same year; the fourth case was the murder of Robert, a policeman, in 1979; the fifth was the murder of Sidik, a member of the Pak Kucing community, Samalantan in 1982; the sixth case was the murder of Djaelani in Sei Ambawang in 1983; the seventh case was when a Madurese man stabbed a Dayak youth to death in Gg. Apel Pontianak in 1983; the eighth case was the stabbing to death of a Dayak man by road workers from the Madurese community in Tumbang Titi in 1994; the ninth case was the stabbing to death of a Dayak youth in Sangau Ledo in 1996; and the tenth case was the victim of an attack on Asisi in Siantan (a school complex belonging to the Dayak community) where Nyangkot was killed in Paniraman in 1997. During a conflict that took place between late 1996 and March 1997, a large number of displaced persons were evacuated and large IDP camps were set up to shelter the Madurese people expelled from the Sambas district. Enormous loss of life and property occurred at this time. This particular incident is often referred to as the Sanggau Ledo violence, because violence first broke out in the Sanggau Ledo sub-district. The eleventh case was

the murder of Martinus Amat, a Dayak man from Kelawit, Samalantan in 1999. Conflicts that occurred before 1997 were mostly between ethnic Madurese and ethnic Dayak people, but the conflict that broke out in 1999 involved the ethnic Madurese community on one hand and ethnic Malay Sambas and Dayaks on the other.

On 19 January 1999, coinciding with the Idul Fitri celebration day, the ethnic Malay people in Parit Setia village, in the Javai sub-district, were taken by surprise when they were attacked by thousands of Madurese people fully armed with all types of weapons — an incident that has popularly come to be known as the ‘Bloody Idul Fitri Tragedy’ (*Tragedi Lebaran Berdara*). This incident did not spread to other areas because of the speedy reaction of the security authorities. Not long after this bloody incident, however, other incidences followed that continued to fuel the situation, climaxing around March 1999 when all ethnic Madurese people were unceremoniously forced out of the Sambas district.

Since the occurrences of January to April 1999, all ethnic Madurese people, both the generations born in Sambas (those who just knew Sambas as their birthplace) and those who physically migrated from Madura (those born outside Sambas), were forced to emigrate. Some of them returned to the islands of Madura and East Java, while those who had never known the island of Madura were accommodated in temporary IDP camps in Pontianak town and district. A small number of these did not want to live in IDP camps near the local population in Pontianak town and district. There were a number of cases where IDPs registered an economic recovery just a few days after residing in camps. They then bought houses around the town of Pontianak and left the IDP camps. Data on IDP camps are presented in Table 7.

**Table 7: Internally Displaced Person (IDP) camps in Sambas
January-April 1999**

No.	District / town	Location	Total	
			Number of people	Number of families
1	Sambas district	In camps:		
		- Marhaban	4,227	905
		Outside camps:		
		- Tujuh Belas sub-district	3,338	554
		- Pasiran sub-district	611	131
		- Roban sub-district	2,145	284
Total number of displaced persons in the Sambas district			10,321	1,874
2	Pontianak district	In camps:		
		- Wajok	6,385	1,202
		- Denzibang/Camp B	370	71
		Outside camps:		
		- Sei Pinyuh	2,354	430
		- Mempawah Hilir	1,213	136
		- Sei Kunyit	593	136
		- Siantan	808	161
		- Sei Raya	5,000	902
		- Sei Kakap	900	172
		- Sebangki	56	18
		- Kuala Mandor B	100	16
		- Sei Ambawang	1,099	303
Total number of displaced persons in the Pontianak district			18,878	3,547
3	Pontianak town	In camps:		
		- Gg. Jariayah	249	59
		- Gudang Sei Jawi	228	59
		- Haji Hostel	5,979	1,121
		- Pangsuma Sports Hall	7,412	1,178
		- Sultan Abdurrahman	6,043	1,017
		- Bumi Khatulistiwa Sports Hall*	343	1,792
		- Untan Sports Hall	1,190	257
		Outside c amps:		
		- North Pontianak district	10,013	1,977
		- West Pontianak district	2,315	440
- East Pontianak district	1,494	145		
		- South Pontianak district	3,020	455
Total number of displaced persons in Pontianak town			39,735	7,051
Overall number of displaced persons			68,934	12,472

*Set ablaze by masses during the violence of 24 June 2001.

Source: Department of Transmigration and PPH, West Kalimantan (2001).

3.5 Problems arising in IDP camps

The Sambas conflict has a very long history that started with a series of recurring incidences that were initially treated as minor and ignored. But they were ultimately blown out of proportion and culminated in a serious and complex problem. Various accounts from a number of sources seek to illustrate the background of this complex conflict. Detailed investigation reveals that the main cause

was accumulated anger over a long period of time. For decades, the Malay people felt oppressed by the Madurese whom they perceived to be very arrogant. This inevitably and systematically developed into hatred, and ultimately, to the emergence of ethnic conflict.

The problem has been further complicated by the fact that while some groups are endeavouring to seek solutions, others are looking for ways to reap material or financial gain. Those intending to benefit from the crisis are targeting not only government, but also the Madurese IDP community in the camps and other Madurese people in Pontianak.

In addition, IDPs stationed in camps on a temporary basis have remained there longer than expected because of the government's failure to address the problem in a systematic manner. Lack of funds has prolonged the situation, with IDPs remaining in camps for unnecessarily long periods of time. As a consequence, residents of camps have adjusted to the tough living conditions and have adapted to new social, economic, and cultural realities.

These long periods of time, together with uncertainty on the part of the government in solving the IDP problem, have forced refugees to seek alternative solutions on their own initiative to meet daily family needs. Those with initial capital have started small businesses, such as becoming roving sellers of small foods (*bakso*), or opening kiosks to sell cigarettes and even petrol on the roadside, some have been employed as construction and road workers, and some, especially small children, have resorted to street begging at strategic places along main roads, while others scavenge in rubbish pits in the hope of making economic gain out of anything discarded.

Our research indicates that there are three crucial sets of problems in the IDP camps.

3.5.1 Economic problems

Economic problems, such as poverty, occur for various reasons. First, when the violence broke out, these people did not have the opportunity to leave their homes with anything except a little clothing and minor household utilities of no economic value. They were not poor when they were in Sambas. Most of them were successful farmers, and a good number were relatively rich people. One IDP commented that a large number of displaced persons in the camp were formerly very successful farmers: 'I abandoned ripening rice fields that were ready for harvest and heads of cattle.'

The second reason is the late response in handling the IDP problem by the appropriate institutions. Declining economic conditions would not arise if the assistance allocated for IDPs were to reach them as originally intended. One interviewee said, 'For the period of two years and seven months I have been in the camp, I have only received assistance in form of rice and money for two times.' Such situations have made economic conditions for IDPs extremely difficult, forcing them to seek alternative means of survival by looking for employment. One IDP remarked, 'In order to be able to survive in the internal displaced person camp, we must engage members of the family in some kind of activity for livelihood and children have been forced to give up school.' The fact that assistance intended for IDPs has been diverted was indirectly acknowledged by a number of local government officials who were interviewed. They contended that many officials have become rich overnight after becoming involved in the IDP project.

3.5.2 Social problems

The social problems that arise are diverse. They include social strain between the IDPs and the local population and, as a consequence, there is often misunderstanding between them. Most of the children of IDPs have dropped out of school; many have been forced to work as street beggars and scavenge in rubbish pits. Groups of IDPs representing particular interests have also emerged, for example, those who prefer to remain in IDP camps and those who prefer relocation. Another

problem that is quite evident, but which is difficult to verify, is the emergence of prostitution. The non-IDP population in particular has expressed concern about the increasing incidences of prostitution.

Lack of communication between the local population and the IDPs often causes social strain, leading to attitudes of suspicion and mistrust. For example, the local residents often look on IDPs as a favoured group. This complaint is based on the fact that every IDP is entitled to Rp 1.500 and half a kilogram of rice per day, though they may not actually receive them. In addition, IDPs receive basic facilities, such as clean water and electricity, at zero cost. The locals see displaced persons as a favoured group because even without working they are assured of the basic requirements to support minimum living conditions. IDPs also obtain a relatively good side income, usually earned from their scavenging activities, street cleaning, slashing, construction work, street begging, sale and delivery of newspapers and other income-earning activities. Many IDPs have established small kiosks and eating-places along street pavements. Much of the income earned by displaced persons is obtained from activities that the local Dayak and Malay communities have never engaged in. A very respectable young Malay man made the observation that displaced persons are:

People forced by conditions to live better than other social groups of people because of their behaviour. Displaced persons appreciate and are ready to live under any conditions because they are capable of living under any simple shed, take a shower in a river and eat rice with salt. Besides that, the local population has also lost various social amenities like sports halls and stadiums that have been used to temporarily house displaced persons.

This observation is substantiated by interviews with IDPs. One remarked, 'Why should I move away to a location that is too far away and when I am not even sure of getting employment? I better remain here, accept any form of employment, after all there is free water and electricity.'

The social problems of IDPs do not arise solely from the conflict between them and the local population. A decline in self-reliance amongst the Madurese is leading to a mentality of dependence. In addition, suspicion and a strong feeling that they are a forgotten group of people dominate life in the IDP camps. The camps and surrounding areas are dangerous zones with a high potential to spark off an explosive conflict. For the town population, passing near IDP camps requires extra caution. Indeed, whenever it is possible, they will avoid passing near such places.

The perpetuation of socio-economic problems in IDP camps has gradually led to a chronic humanitarian crisis. A clear reflection of these conditions can be established through interviews with non-IDP people, with IDPs themselves, particularly those residing in temporary camps, with non-camp resident IDPs and direct observations in the field. Non-IDP people observe 'exploitative' tendencies among the displaced persons. They have a stereotyped belief that Madurese IDPs often exploit one another, leading to the coining of the '3M', that is, *Madura Makan Madura* or 'Madurese eats fellow Madurese'. One informant remarked:

They lead very difficult lives. But we also do not know how to create solidarity among themselves as they are not compact. How can someone trusted by government as a community leader to coordinate every internal displaced person activity be suspected of not representing the interest of his own people (displaced persons). Moreover such a leader does not even have the guts to visit the internal displaced person camps because he fears to be attacked by the masses. I don't know this happens. But circulating rumours among the displaced persons have it that much of the money allocated for Madura displaced persons is actually being misappropriated by Madura people themselves. This occurs at all levels ranging from top right up to internal displaced person camps, hence popularising the 3M (Madura Makan Madura).

Similar information was available not only from interviews with non-Madurese people, but also from interviews with various Madurese community elders. When a joint interview was held with a Dayak and a Madurese community leader, there was unison in response to the authenticity of this allegation.

In a situation where everyone strives to reap as much material gain as possible, it becomes quite obvious that many groups are bound to become innocent victims. The researchers observed this directly in Pangsuma Camp — an IDP camp popularly known to be inhabited by a fragmented group of displaced persons that are the most difficult to control. At the time that direct observations and interviews were conducted at this camp, an exercise involving recollection of data was being undertaken, and provision of basic requirements (food) also took place once during the same period. Interestingly, some IDPs, especially the elderly, were unaware that such activities took place at all.

3.5.3 Cultural problems

As has already been pointed out, the Madurese IDPs live in a state of uncertainty with no time limits, a situation that has pushed their living conditions to the lowest possible level. Forced by the need for survival, many of them have focused on activities they have never before engaged in. Many IDP children have become beggars and scavengers. One principle maintained by all displaced persons is that life must continue whatever the means. The values of pragmatic and realistic culture have become part of their daily life. It is this culture that has actually enabled them to adapt to their new living conditions with relative ease.

The main cultural problem is lack of trust within the IDP community. The problem of mistrust has been aggravated by allegations against their own community leaders. It can be said that this is a crucial problem in IDP camps and must be resolved as soon as possible. Hardships in IDP camps and various experiences at the peak of the conflict have led to the emergence of a new generation of 'heroes' in these communities, and there is a tendency for people in the camps to pay heed only to what these new 'heroes' say. Government authorities are not yet aware of this development, and this has delayed finding a speedy and permanent solution to the IDP problem.

4. The government's response to IDP problems

4.1 National policies and strategies

It is important to discuss the policies and strategies in handling IDPs at central and local government level. At the national level, policies are intent on accelerating the handling of IDPs through three channels:

- 1) The first policy is to return the IDPs to their normal life, which means they return to their places of origin in peace. This goal can be achieved through willingness on the part of the IDPs, readiness by local communities to accept their return and support by the government. The most important aspect to achieving this is to create a feeling of security and comfort, as well as the strengthening of reconciliation guided by relevant government officials. The implementation of this program is the responsibility of the Ministry of Social Welfare and Local Government.
- 2) The second policy is empowerment within their current location. The empowerment of IDPs is needed to give them the opportunity to start a new life within an existing community, with assistance and facilitation from the government, whether in terms of employment or facilities to make it easier for them to earn a living. This program is implemented at central government level by the State Ministry for Cooperatives and Small-Medium Enterprises and the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration and Local Government.

3) The third policy is resettlement. This aims to resettle IDPs in a new site through a relocation program — by insertion or local transmigration. This requires a significantly higher budget to clear land, build houses and public facilities, provide farming tools and equipment and provide a living allowance for a period of time. Policies supported by agricultural or plantation programs have very good prospects for IDPs in the future. This program is implemented by the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration and the Ministry of Housing and Regional Infrastructure and Local Government. The central government hopes that the handling of IDPs will be completed by the end of December 2002.

At the management level, there are three strategies:

- 1) The handling of IDPs is to be conducted by, and is the responsibility of, a 'one gate' policy by governors, as heads of Satkorlak PBP in their respective provinces.
- 2) The technical ministries at the central level, through the coordination of Bakornas PBP, will act as the technical managers/supervisors in their respective sectors.
- 3) The emergency shelters will be emptied in accordance with the implementation of the first two strategies.

At the local government level, especially in the research area (Pontianak, West Kalimantan), discussion will be focused on three major periods:

- first, the rescue period or evacuation after the outbreak of violence in Sambas;
- second, the relocation period; and
- third, the reconciliation period.

The organisational pattern of every period will also be addressed. It is hoped that these three periods will be analysed further by looking at the organisational aspects, that is, who carries out the implementation process of handling IDP problems and how they do this, and the environmental aspects that influence the process. The environmental aspects will be considered from three points of view: external environment, internal environment and supporting resources.

4.2 The rescue period

When the violence in Sambas broke out, government policy during this period was mainly focused on rescue efforts to save as many people as possible from being victimised. First, an evacuation process was carried out when violence broke out. At that time, all efforts by government authorities were focused on the evacuation of those trapped by the conflict. This was simultaneously carried out by various institutions based on the underlying principles of each institution. During this period, the safest action was to evacuate all ethnic Madurese people out of the Sambas district. This was in accordance with the demands by the non-Madurese local communities in Sambas.

The enormous number of IDPs forced the local government authorities to change strategy and create temporary IDP camps in various locations normally used by the public, such as hostels for pilgrims (*asrama haji*), sports halls and the Tanjung Pura University Stadium. Local government authorities established these IDP camps, and from 14 July 2000 began providing the following: rice (400 g per person per day, plus Rp. 1,500 to buy sauce), cooking utensils, a public cooking place, emergency health facilities to control various contagious diseases, coordinating centres for receiving and channelling aid and relief, religious and education centres, scholarship centres, centres for mass circumcision and places of worship. In the field of health, free treatment was provided and efforts were made to create and maintain a healthy environment, such as collection of rubbish and other waste materials, provision of clean water, provision of public toilet facilities and general

cleanliness of the camps. The Public Works Department constructed a total of 50 public toilet facilities. In terms of health, efforts were made to spray the IDP camps, provide public facilities, immunise babies, treat worms and so on. One public works employee noted that:

It can be said that whatever we are doing is just to save Madura people and contain the conflict. We are doing our best to provide whatever is possible within our means. At that time no coordination effort had been done between the related institutions. Each institution had to employ all tactics or available operational funds to contain this extraordinary situation.

The next big effort was to find a way to forge a dialogue between the parties engaged in the conflict. Both government and private institutions, together with non-governmental organisations and members of the warring communities, coordinated this effort. The local government authorities endeavoured to engage in intensive mediation between the communities at conflict. These reconciliation efforts did not yield immediate results, and the local population was meanwhile becoming overwhelmed by the extent of the IDP crisis. They wanted the IDPs to be moved away from their public facilities as soon as possible so they could use them again. It was due to this increasing pressure that the idea was developed to relocate the IDPs to a new place altogether, either on a temporary or permanent basis.

4.3 The relocation period

As has been explained earlier, the intention of local government officials and the majority of the local community in Pontianak town was to rescue the Madurese people who were victims of the conflict in Sambas and then shelter them in IDP camps (using various public facilities) as a temporary measure. No-one anticipated that the problem would turn out to be as complicated as it eventually became because they all thought that some sort of reconciliation would soon be achieved and the Madurese people would return to Sambas.

In order to control excessively negative sentiments against IDPs located in the midst of the local populace, such as the incident that occurred on 24 June 2001 which involved setting IDPs and their property ablaze, relocation was considered as the only feasible option. At the same time, efforts to seek reconciliation between groups involved in the conflict were continued. In an effort to put into place a hasty program to move IDPs from temporary camps to new relocation areas, the government, through various institutions, established new settlement areas for them. It was unfortunate, however, that every government institution organised its own relocation program and that these could not easily be integrated with programs initiated and operated by other related institutions, whether vertically or horizontally. One government official, a sub-district head, had this to say:

We are not aware of the relocation program. All we know is that there is a project in our area of jurisdiction because we have never been told about it and invited to coordinate the program, what else can we do? Just imagine that not even the district head has knowledge about it, what about we at the lower level of government? We were actually just informed by the local people after they had been affected since their land (as they have all evidence of ownership) was confiscated I understand, in the interest of the so-called internal displaced person projects. Provincial government officials and other institutions only informed us about it after the conflict broke out between the project officials and the local people, and they actually requested for our assistance just to seek a solution to this conflict.

This statement has an element of truth because after some time, a private television station ran a story to the effect that there was a conflict over land between the local population and the people

running the construction project intended to relocate IDPs. This is not, however, the only incident that IDPs see as problematic. Lack of clarity about the status of land has made them extremely cautious and reluctant to reside in the new relocation areas. One IDP who lives outside the camp in a rented house said:

Why must we necessarily follow government desire? Their way of working is not good. We inspected the location for relocation. It is located very far away from town deep in the forest. Getting somewhere to buy kerosene is just very difficult, how difficult will it then be to sell one's produce. We are also told that the land they have used for relocation is disputed land. Must we sacrifice our lives again? If all alternatives involve death then why not just die from here? Whether I die here or in the internal displaced person camp, I will all the same be buried.

A large number of IDPs interviewed at various hostels where they had been temporarily camped indicated that they were still seriously traumatised by the existing conflict. Some of them could not even conceal their sadness and grief and they could not explain why they were victimised in the first place. Those traumatised generally reject the proposal to be resettled or relocated in a different place as they interpret this to be just another way of giving up their lives. When the researchers asked the IDPs why they were opposed to relocation, a common response was: 'Must we be returned to war areas just for the mere reason that the land previously allocated to us traditionally belongs to Dayak people?'

On the other hand, a considerable number of IDPs strongly believe that they must migrate — they want and are prepared to move away. 'It is impossible that we can be subjected to such a kind of life for ever,' was expressed by a young person in an IDP camp at Tanjung Pura University Sports Hall. Their strong desire to move away is very real; however, the rationale of when and where to migrate are the big questions for which they do not have answers.

For this reason, whenever IDPs want to be moved away, they often demand a number of conditions as prerequisites for their migration. The first is that they must survey or visit the intended new location in the company of government officials. The underlying reason here is the genuine fear that their representatives delegated to survey the new area may never return to the camp, as they may be killed. They also insist that they must physically inspect the conditions of the intended relocation site. Second, they demand that the government must provide lunch. Third, they demand that the government must take full responsibility for transporting them to the location and returning them to the IDP camp. Fourth, the government must compensate them financially for lost revenue on the day of the inspection. When asked why they demand such difficult conditions, their response is that the relocation program is in the interest of the government and not in the interest of the displaced Madurese people.

According to government officials, IDPs from various camps have on a number of occasions been invited to move to new relocation areas. Although the government has done its best to fulfill the conditions set by IDPs as prerequisites to moving, the reality is that very few of them have actually been willing to move. In the view of the IDPs, the new settlement area is not suitable for human habitation. There are so many shortfalls that many IDPs believe they are being made to suffer just for the sake of money. 'Who is interested in living in a forest with millions of mosquitoes? Only as early as 1500 hours one can be brave enough to come out of the house because of too many mosquitoes,' exclaimed one IDP. Another said, 'How can one plant rice when the land that has been given to us is a forest and with very huge trees?' This resistance against relocation has frustrated efforts towards the development of IDP relocation programs and wasted the initiative already taken. Table 8 shows the outcomes of the IDP relocation programs during the 2000 financial year.

Table 8: Realised relocation of IDPs by location and agency, 2000

No	Location	Project implementation agency	Target (Families)	Realised households (units)	Realised occupation	
					(Families)	(People)
1	T. Kacang SP.2	PT Widi Utama Lestari	500	420	420	2,144
2	Parit Haji Ali	PT Putra Nusa Pilar Sejati	300	200	136	653
3	P.Sumber Bahagia I	PT Wiratama Daya Muktitama	400	556	556	2,903
4	P. Sido Mulyo	PT Sebukit Indah	200	100	100	506
5	Pulau Nyamuk	PT Gunung Senujuh	200	117	36	161
6	Tanjung Saleh	PT Gunung Senujuh	150	19	-	-
7	Puguk	PT Wiratama Daya Muktitama	250	50	-	-
Total			2,000	1,462	1,248	6,367

Source: Department of Transmigration and PPH, West Kalimantan (2001).

The above data indicate that the government's good intentions to relocate IDPs in new locations have not yet received a positive response from the IDPs themselves. Various government efforts in this regard have been frustrated and have instead attracted varying responses from both the IDPs and the local population of Pontianak. It would appear that constraints to relocation are multidimensional. First, there is opposition from the local community receiving the IDPs. There is a tendency in areas that initially accept IDPs relocating in their area to later reject them. This has occurred in communities in Padang Tikar, Punggur, part of Rasau Jaya and in a number of villages in the Sungai Ambawang sub-district.

The second constraint comes from the IDPs themselves. Some IDPs are not interested in relocation because they still hope that they will return one day to their area of origin (the district of Sambas/Bengkayang) and resume life just as it was before the outbreak of violence. This belief is strengthened by the bitter reality that they abandoned their property, rice fields and livestock when they were forced to migrate. This desire, however, is a mere dream because the local community in Sambas is not prepared under any circumstances to accept back people of Madurese origin. The Sambas community maintains that they were traumatised by various bad experiences when they lived close to Madurese people, although they admit that only a few elements in the Madurese community were responsible.

The third constraint still concerns IDPs but is also very closely associated with government performance. The fact that, as a result of the government's slow response in addressing the problem, IDPs stay in camps for a very long time has made many of them adapt to conditions of life in town. This economic adaptation includes IDPs finding employment as casual labourers at construction projects, as street cleaners, newspaper sellers, food sellers, scavenging rubbish pits (*pemulung*) and carrying goods in the market, while some have become street beggars. In relation to the issue of street beggars, one informant pointed out that before the outbreak of the current IDP crisis, the town of Pontianak was completely free from street begging activities. The social adaptation that has taken place has enabled the IDP community to integrate into normal aspects of life — such as in education and other local community activities. They have also been able to form a solid unity in the local community.

In reality, the temporary shelter provided to IDPs in designated camps is not followed up with a satisfactory program to find a permanent solution to the problem. It should be pointed out that there are serious obstacles to solving this problem that cannot easily be overcome in a short time. This is further aggravated by the tendency of IDPs to resist any effort to move them away from temporary camps as they have gradually acclimatised to the new urban environment. The situation is made even worse by the fact that there has been no coordination in handling this problem right from the onset. There is currently even a rumour circulating among the Pontianak community, whether people of Madurese, Malay or Dayak ethnic groups, to the effect that some well-placed interest groups are reaping substantial economic gain from the IDP crisis. This information was obtained not only from IDP sources, but also from government officials of West Kalimantan province. They warn that a permanent solution to this problem may never be achieved because many people have vested interests in the continued presence of IDPs in temporary camps.

The undesirable consequence of this development is a situation of envy, suspicion and mistrust among elements of the community involved in handling IDPs. Issues such as 3M (*Madura Makan Madura*) send a signal that Madurese people themselves are taking advantage of other IDPs from Madura to make personal fortunes on the pretext of solving the problem. For their part, IDPs in camps are suspicious and uneasy about local government officials, who they believe have never been straightforward in giving them what is their due in terms of their daily basic requirements. They are also very suspicious of government officials who exaggerate the total number of people and families in IDP camps. In addition, various government institutions endeavour to compete for IDP funds and provision of assistance without coordinating their activities.

By all accounts the violence in Sambas was extreme beyond imagination and so the extent of the IDP problem took government authorities by surprise. It should be emphasised that the never-ending IDP problem in Pontianak cannot be isolated from the lack of coordination between different institutions and the various conflicting interests towards IDPs. The problem has been further exacerbated by the endeavours of a number of groups seeking to make personal fortune or material gain from the existence of IDPs. These selfish people seeking to enrich themselves at the expense of the refugees originate not only from the government but also from the Madurese community itself — some of them are IDPs while others are not. On the other hand, IDPs have been forced to settle in designated camps much longer than originally intended because of the government's inability to counter the problem. As a consequence, they have become increasingly used to conditions in the camps and have adapted to the new challenges socially, economically and culturally.

Whatever the local government authorities are doing to address the problem of IDPs, such as the efforts to move them away to new relocation areas, it is not enough. Specifically, the obstacles to solving IDP problems can be categorised as outlined below.

The first problem lies within the IDP community. Displaced persons of Madurese origin are currently concentrated in IDP camps spread across various areas. Interestingly, different groups have developed within these camps. Various systems of living or survival mechanisms have developed among the IDP communities, such as the *arisan* system to provide housing for members in the group in turn, the *cicilan* system for construction of camps, *premanism* for buying and selling of foodstuffs and a growing indication of prostitution in the IDP camps. Fragmentation of interest groups under the leadership of various community leaders is also taking place in the camps. This has made communication between government and the IDPs increasingly difficult.

The second issue is the adaptive nature of IDPs. Displaced persons are generally very patient, resilient, tolerant and hardworking people. When confronted by tough social and economic conditions, they are able to recover slowly. Therefore it is logical for IDPs to resist government plans to be moved away from camps as they already have access to clean water, electricity, food and free education for their children (although several contend that there is no longer free education for their children). In addition, they can obtain supplementary income by looking for casual employment

outside the camp. This lifestyle has gradually restored their hope in life and many of them have ultimately been able to get out of the camps and buy land for settlement. They live between existing buildings in urban areas and this has popularly come to be known as the 'insertion settlement pattern'.

Obstacles to relocation arise not only from resistance by IDPs to moving away, but also because they have succeeded in adjusting to conditions and life in town. One of the most contentious issues is the problem of education for their children. Many IDP children have been able to proceed with their studies in the schools close to temporary IDP camps. A significant number are currently in the second grade of secondary school (SLTP). Interviews conducted at one of the camps, Tanjungpura University Sports Hall, revealed how they feel when their young ones, currently at SLTP second grade, must be moved away to a new relocation area with minimum education facilities: 'This family has nine children and most of them are in the school going age.' The father now works as a road maintainer.

The third problem lies in the rest of the community — the Dayak, Malay and Madurese non-displaced persons. The non-IDP community generally wants the IDPs to be moved away as soon as possible. They feel that IDPs should no longer continue to use their public facilities. They are also afraid of the increasing number of street beggars in their midst, especially along the main roads. There are increasing concerns as security is no longer assured and IDPs might harbour firearms that range from home-made to automatic guns. This fact was vividly manifested on one occasion when open conflict broke out in various places. At the time, the local population attacked the IDPs because there was a rumour that the latter had done something that led to the death of a small child. When the local community fired into the camps, the IDPs returned fire using automatic weapons. This incident sent shock waves across the local community and the question was asked: how could IDPs possibly have access to automatic weapons in their camps? It became apparent that without a serious effort by security authorities to contain the situation, the number of victims from the Malay and Dayak communities could increase.³

The fourth problem is associated with the bureaucracy, in particular those directly concerned with the IDP problem. There are shortfalls in the system of operation and coordination that are related to transparency of information and the fact that policies are unclear. The lack of clear information about various issues relating to the government's effort to address the IDP problem led to the emergence of rumours among the IDPs. These rumours ultimately became an obstacle to the government's efforts to relocate these people. On a number of occasions, agreement was reached between the government and the IDPs but, at the end of the day, this became invalid because of rumours that broke out within the IDP camps.

One rumour that created a problem was one that circulated among IDPs that the government would provide assistance, in the form of money amounting to Rp 15 million per family, as compensation for the property they had had to abandon. This rumour made them continue waiting for the allegedly promised money before leaving the camp. Although the government has recently endeavoured to

³ There are various explanations as to why refugees are in possession of automatic weapons. One theory is that there is a supply of firearms from abroad through Malaysia. This view is further substantiated by the fact that there are many entrepreneurs in the water transport business who are of ethnic Madurese origin, who, according to the Malay, are providing direct material support to the refugees. The police authorities confirm this phenomenon. However, they also believe this to be a fair arrangement, since if the refugees are in possession of firearms, there might be a balance of power leading to a natural realisation of 'peace'. The police are still traumatised by what took place in the initial days of the conflict in Sambas. The ethnic Malay and Dayak communities demanded that the Madurese people be disarmed, but immediately after this was done, the village was attacked and days of indiscriminate killing followed in what amounted to ethnic cleansing. The police have documented proof of the incidents, in the form of photographs, and they are not in a hurry to disarm refugees again unless they are absolutely sure that they are safe.

clarify that such rumours are baseless, compensation is of paramount importance to the IDPs. Some of them believe that with compensation, they will be able to meet their transport requirements to move to new locations such as Bengkalis or Riau and start a new life altogether. Some of them do not rule out the possibility of returning to Java with all their families.

The idea of compensation, however, seems not to be favoured by the government, which is afraid that after compensation, there is a strong likelihood that the compensated Madurese people may leave the IDP camps and once again spread themselves all across the city. Most bureaucrats believe that they will make wheelbarrows and transform them into roving kiosks, then simply sleep in them at night.

For 1999–2000, the government allocation of funds for IDPs through various sectors was about 66 billion rupiah (see Table 9 below). The government funds have been managed by various institutions without clear inter-institutional coordination and this has consequently led to confusion of information. For example, the total number of IDPs in temporary camps has never been clearly established. There are a number of informants in the field who challenge the published IDP figures on the grounds that they are inaccurate. They believe that this is deliberate because there are elements within some of the institutions involved that benefit financially and materially from such misreporting of IDP figures. This is also true of the funds allocated to cater for IDP daily feeding requirements. This information varies from one IDP to another as some of them point out that they were only catered for during the first few months in the camps.

Table 9: Allocation of funds for displaced persons, 1999/2000 and 2000

Financial year	Type of activity	Location	In Rp.000	Implementing institution
1999/2000	Development of housing, kitchen facilities (without special facilities) Remarks: involved 112 families	Sei Asam Village, Pontianak District	453,540	Village Community Development Office
1999/2000	Provision of implements and infrastructure, emergency IDP camps (tents, public toilets, public kitchen, health centres, rubbish collection centres, water pumps, places of worship etc) Remarks: temporary IDP camps	Pontianak Municipality, Singkawang, Sambas District, Tebang Kacang, Pontianak District		
1999/2000	Construction of houses, <i>gentong</i> plastic, preparation of land, farming implements, seeds, fertilisers, food, assistance for burial, public facilities *(Office unit, village halls, mosques, stores, housing for employees, housing for unit head), road network (<i>jalan poros</i> , village roads, sports facilities, wooden bridges, <i>dermaga</i>) Remarks: general trans. pattern for 500 families	Tebang Kacang SP I Village Pontianak District	5,982,631	Regional Office for Transmigration and PPH
1999/2000	Handling emergencies: Development of IDP camps	Singkawang, Pontianak	4,670,562	Public Works, Cipta Karya

1999/2000	Drainage	Tebang Kacang District Pontianak	4,633,142	Water Resources Department
-----------	----------	-------------------------------------	-----------	----------------------------------

Table 9 (cont'd): Allocation of funds for displaced persons, 1999/2000 and 2000

Financial Year	Type of Activity	Location	In Rp.000	Implementing Institution
2000	Building primary, secondary and tertiary channels, main roads, feeder roads, reopening roads, housing, development SP, public facilities and social amenities, rehabilitation (two primary schools, a market, <i>Kapolsos</i> , teachers' houses, dispensary, housing for nurses, meeting halls, mosques, house type 21, housing for school head, stores, bridges etc. Remarks: plantation pattern for 2000 families	Village Sei Asam, District Pontianak	19,800,00 0	Public Works Sub Dinas Cipta Karya
2000	Drainage	Village Sei Asam, Village Punggur District Pontianak	2,176,443	Water Resources Department
2000	Construction of houses, plastic water containers, preparation of land, farming implements, seeds, fertilisers, food, assistance for burial, public facilities *(Office unit, village halls, mosques, stores, housing for employees, housing for unit head), road network (main roads, village roads, sports facilities, wooden bridges, ports) Remarks: insertion settlement pattern for 1,500 families	Tebang Kacang SP II, Village Parit H. Ali, Parit Sumber Bahagia, Parit Sidomulyo, Nyamuk Island, Saleh Peninsular, Village Puguk District Pontianak	9,804,016	Regional Office for Transmigration and PPH
2000	Improvement of diet, healthy environment, prevention of diseases	Carried out in many locations	400,000	Health Department
2001	Development of housing and public facilities (1,250 families)	Carried out in many locations	11,000,00 0	Dinas Sonakerduk
2001	<i>Lauk Pauk</i> (type of food)	Carried out in many locations	3,099,300	Ex Regional office, Social Department
2001	Assistance in plantation management (coconut plantations)	Carried out in many locations	413,940	Plantation Department

Total

**66,649,25
2**

Source: Department of Transmigration and PPH, West Kalimantan (2001).

The IDP relocation activities that have so far been carried out by various institutions in West Kalimantan are presented in Table 10.

Table 10: Realised IDP relocation activities

Financial year/ pattern	Location	Targeted housing units	Realised housing units	Realised relocation (families)
1999/2000:				
1. General Trans	1. Tebang Kacang (SP-1)	500	500	500
2. Insertion	2. Prt. Basir and Sari Farma	220 *	112	82
2000:				
1. Insertion	1. Tebang Kacang (SP II)	500	420	420
	2. Parit Sidomulyo and Sumber Bahagia	770	656	556
	3. Parit Haji Ali	300	200	108
	4. Nyamuk Island and Saleh Peninsular	350	136	36
	5. Puguk	250	50	0
2. Plantations	River Asam	2,000	1,558**	0
Total		4,890	3,632	1,702**

Note: * Not yet achieved.

** Tentative figures (striving to achieve the set target).

Source: Department of Transmigration and PPH, West Kalimantan (2001).

If Tables 9 and 10 are closely examined, there is strong evidence of a lack of inter-institutional coordination. Various local government officials approached for comments echoed this fact. They admit that the handling of IDP problems has so far been more or less random, without inter-institutional coordination, and this has often created obstacles leading to new sets of problems in IDP camps. On 24 June 2001, there was an attempted robbery at a shop located in the same complex as the Sports Hall in West Kalimantan. This incident led to the death of the robbed trader's child, which in turn triggered spontaneous mass riots and culminated in the Sports Hall being set ablaze. As a result, just five days after this explosive incident, the Governor of West Kalimantan issued a letter, reference no. SK Gubernur Nomor: 141 of 2001 dated 29 June 2001, authorising the creation of a joint operation team to relocate the IDPs away from the social violence in Sambas. This letter authorised the creation of a joint operation team involving various institutions — the local government, the local Legislative Assembly (parliament), security authorities, regional planning institutions (*Bappeda*), non-governmental organisations and local community leaders. The primary focus was to ensure that IDPs were relocated in specifically designated places.

When our researchers visited the research area, the activities being carried out by the joint operation team included gathering detailed data on all IDPs in the camps. The data gathered by the team is presented in Table 9. As well as collecting data, the team was also involved in the distribution of essential requirements to the IDPs, including money amounting to Rp.1,500 per day and about half a kilogram of rice per day over a period of one month. In order to obtain accurate

data, field operatives had to take a photograph of every IDP. This was intended to demystify the belief that data on the number of IDPs was deliberately increased in order to benefit some officials.

In a dialogue with the Vice-President of Indonesia during her visit to Pontianak, the IDPs insisted that they were not interested in relocation, but rather they wanted to return to the district of Sambas, their area of origin (Liputan 6 SCTV, 1800 hrs, 12 September 2001).

In view of all this, it can be concluded that enormous obstacles lie in the way of relocation. First, there is the outright rejection of this concept by local communities in proposed relocation areas. The main reason given for this is the lack of information by the government about the program, which has led to the emergence of a classic problem concerning land. Land that is currently used by the government has created a new problem. When it is earmarked for relocation, this has been interpreted as the confiscation of community land by the government.⁴

The second problem is resistance by IDPs to being moved away. This situation has arisen for a number of reasons. First, there is the mushrooming of various interest groups in the IDP camps. These groups enjoy incredibly high popularity and are very influential among the IDPs compared to the people who have been known by the government to be community representatives or leaders for a long time. Unfortunately, the government authorities do not recognise these new groups and instead invite the traditional 'unpopular' representatives as partners in dialogue and problem solving. This is ironic, as these community leaders who are supposed to represent IDP interests do not even dare enter the IDP camps.

The refusal of displaced persons to mix with other IDP groups is another challenging problem. It is interesting to note that displaced persons do not always speak with one voice. Since they originate from different areas, it is not uncommon for IDPs from one area to have either positive or negative attitudes towards those from other areas.

The lack of seriousness by bureaucrats in addressing the IDP problem has made displaced persons believe that their plight is simply being used to generate money and other fortunes, since there is no humanity in the whole process. They become merely a 'project'. Under such circumstances, no transparency in the program can be expected. Indeed, there is evidence that every institution is running its own program in isolation with no inter-institutional coordination. Bureaucrats make comments such as, 'You can see for yourself how difficult it will be to implement the relocation program as it not yet acceptable to the displaced persons. The distance is very far, who wants to live in a forest?' This attitude by government officials somehow justifies the IDPs' reasons for rejecting relocation in newly designated areas on the grounds that the conditions are unsuitable for human habitation.

⁴ In the view of the wider community, this is a very serious issue, but government generally treats it as a small and simple problem. According to the local community, the government decided to use a block of land some six kilometres square without permission from the local community. The original piece of community land measured five by eight kilometres. The local residents reported the matter to the sub-district authorities, who could not advise them about which legal channels to pursue as they too had no knowledge of which office would handle such matters. The sub-district head maintained that all institutions refused to accept responsibility for solving this problem. The locals were referred from one office to another with no solution. Our researchers made enquiries with the institutions that were approached by the sub-district authorities. They denied such allegations outright. They even attempted to provide documented proof showing that the land in question was not a problem. However, when they tried to find the document, it could not be located. They said that the bag containing the document had been left at home. An appointment to proceed with the interview was arranged for the following day, but the officer in question could not get to the office that day because the road was flooded.

Relocation is the only feasible option for the government and it is supported by a large part of the community, although it is rejected by the IDPs. They are not entirely to blame as the program determines relocation areas that are of little economic and social significance. Criteria for the selection of land are based on distance, quality of buildings, economic access, education facilities and so on. But schools have no teachers, there are no marketplaces, roads are unstable during the wet season and relocation areas are a long way away from other places, requiring several hours of travel just to get the riverbank.

The critical views of IDPs have motivated them to pose challenging questions, such as whether the government believes that the conflict in Sambas broke out exclusively because of Madurese people, or also because of the government's earlier relocation program. The IDPs ask: 'Don't they think that forming new groups in new locations will create new problems?'; and: 'What guarantee is there that this will not cause a new type of conflict?'

4.4 Reconciliation

In an attempt to seek a solution to the current conflict, two lines of thought have developed both among the IDP and non-IDP communities — it is a choice between reconciliation and relocation. It must be emphasised, however, that both alternatives are equally challenging. Moreover, a detained scrutiny of both options reveals significant social and economic costs. It is not surprising that reconciliation is the more popular choice among the Madurese people (i.e. the IDP community), whereas relocation is the option strongly favoured by the local Pontianak community.

A number of obstacles stand in the way of reconciliation. These include, among others, a deep feeling of mistrust by the Sambas community towards the IDPs. One community leader from the Malay ethnic group said:

Most of the Malay and perhaps the Dayak as well, never trust the Madura people. We have made various agreements with them in the past, but it is always they who violate it. This has not occurred only once, not twice, but several times. Enough is enough! Let them (Madura people) stop dreaming of ever returning to Sambas. Sambas is out of bounds to Madura people.

They regard IDPs with suspicion and believe that they cannot be trusted, as they never keep their promises. The Malay people base the evidence for this belief on their experience of repeated incidences of breach of contract by Madurese people. According to the Sambas community, the conflict with Madurese people will only be solved by completely eliminating them from the Sambas district.

Meanwhile, the Madurese people believe that efforts should be made towards reconciliation, convinced that those who have violated inter-tribal agreements in the past are just an irresponsible element. They believe that reconciliation can be achieved through signing another agreement. They have even coined what they call *kontrak mati* or 'death contract', meaning that they are prepared for any consequence, including death through mob justice, if they act irresponsibly.⁵

This offer has received a cool response from the Malay and the Dayak communities. They still firmly believe that the Madurese will strive for revenge because of their cultural beliefs. They think that

⁵ It is clear that the suggestion put forward by some of the Madurese refugees is still *bernuansa Carok*. Lost life is paid for by life (an 'eye for an eye'). One refugee exclaimed that they should stop talking about '*Pancasila* — what is important is that whoever is wrong must face the law. If necessary, let him be finished so that it becomes a lesson for others.' From this, it is clear that some refugees want to return to Sambas under strict observation of the rule of law.

even if they do not carry out a mass revenge, they will resort to systematic killing of people one by one. Reconciliation is therefore extremely difficult for the government to achieve because of the high potential for conflict and also in view of the outright refusal by the local communities in Sambas to accept resettlement by any Madurese people in their area.

4.5 Bureaucratic aspects of handling IDP problems

It has become increasingly apparent that the performance of government officials is of critical importance in solving IDP problems. As we have already established, solving the problem of IDPs who are victims of the violence in Sambas is a very pressing matter that must be resolved sooner rather than later. Difficulty in solving the IDP problem is also closely associated with the fact that local government authorities and related institutions have no clear policies in addressing these problems. There is a lack of sensitivity by the authorities towards the IDP problem. One IDP, who does not reside in an IDP camp but in a rented house in town, pointed out:

Displaced persons do not actually demand a lot. All they are interested in is certainty about their future. Imagine they must be moved away. It is just reasonable that they are shifted to a place that is suitable for human habitation but not into a forest like what has been offered by government. Whatever the reason for migration, it is not out of their own will that they are forced into refuge. Government must also be willing and prepared to provide transport to those displaced persons who opt to emigrate from West Kalimantan. At the moment, government seems to be reluctant to accommodate opinions originating from displaced persons.

IDPs believe that government officials have no intention of working towards resolving their plight, but instead use the situation to initiate projects that never benefit IDPs, even though they are supposedly established to help them. There appears to be considerable distrust of what government officials are actually trying to do. An example of this was the rumour that every family would receive Rp. 15 million, which the IDPs believed to be an official policy but was in fact just a baseless rumour.

Lack of professionalism on the part of the bureaucracy has also met with a cold response from those IDPs who have rallied support for the government's IDP program. When our researchers visited the IDP coordination post at Tanjungpura University Stadium, the list of families ready to be relocated on a voluntary basis had been displayed on the wall, together with statements by local community leaders in the intended IDP receiving areas that they were ready to accommodate the IDPs. Unfortunately, the willingness of these IDPs to move voluntarily to new relocation areas has been frustrated by the authorities, which have not yet taken proactive measures to facilitate the process. In the meantime, the list has become meaningless. For months, the authorities did not follow up this issue. When a number of IDPs were approached for comment, their answers were simple and straightforward: 'No-one knows what government wants.'

As a result of the lack of professional ethics on the part of the government in handling the IDP problem, there is a risk that efforts to relocate IDPs will be wasted. This is also apparent as far as the management of the program is concerned. It is clear that due to its complexities, the IDP problem should be handled on a sectoral basis, that is, by different sectors of government. The IDP problem attracted serious inter-sectoral attention only after the violent incident of 24 June 2001⁶, an incident that left one person dead and caused widespread destruction of property, including the burning down of Pangsuma Stadium. This was when the Provincial Committee for IDPs was formed.

⁶ This violence was aggravated by the robbery of a motorist and caused the death of his child. This incident occurred near an IDP camp, leading to speculation that the robbery was carried out by a

The IDP Committee was formed following a letter of authority from the Governor of West Kalimantan Province, reference no. 141 of 2001, dated 29 June 2001. The team was faced with the task of convincing the IDPs, who were mostly victims of the violence in Sambas, to accept being moved to new areas. In order to achieve this goal, other tasks were formulated, including information and motivation, evaluation, provision of security guarantees, determining the new locations and monitoring, investigation and then evaluation. This task force, comprising members from various institutions, worked out various ways to expedite the relocation process.

However, there were a number of obstacles to the success of this initiative. They included:

- 1) Misleading information to the effect that financial assistance from government would be forthcoming;
- 2) Threats from those not wanting IDPs to be moved to new relocation areas;
- 3) Fear and security concerns amongst IDPs, who were not sure about security in the new relocation areas;
- 4) A misunderstanding that if IDPs participated in the relocation program, their property abandoned in the place of origin (Sambas/Bengkayang) would be lost;
- 5) Concerns that agricultural land in the new areas could not be cultivated;
- 6) A view that the new settlement place was not suitable for human habitation;
- 7) The feeling that IDPs were being isolated from urban centres with well-developed public amenities and moved to more remote relocation areas with no facilities.

The issues signalled by the IDP coordination team are fairly accurate. An example is the threats from people who do not want IDPs to be moved to relocation areas. Such threats usually originate from IDPs themselves. One IDP suggested that if they are to be moved away, then it must be a very secret operation because their lives will be exposed to danger if the operation is made public.

Security threats towards IDPs in the new relocation areas are not unusual. After independent investigations, IDPs discovered that the proposed relocation places were located in the midst of ethnic Dayak people. They were afraid that in the event of another outbreak of violence, they would not survive attacks by the Dayak. Another contentious issue was the status of land, as yet not clarified. Obstacles to relocation thus originate from both IDPs and government.

The emergence of various claims regarding land ownership in areas that have been designated for the relocation of IDPs is a clear example of this problem. A number of locations that have been designated for the relocation of IDPs have not yet been acquired from their current owners. This has provoked written and verbal protests from the owners. One farmer, who happened to be the owner of one of the areas in question, wrote to the provincial head of public works in West Kalimantan, demanding compensation for his land. This was surveyed land with a certificate of land title, which means that he was the legitimate owner. A number of other farmers also submitted similar demands, some of them even attaching photocopies of their land titles.

Various government programs that have even been implemented have also been constrained. There are obstacles that are both sectoral and inter-sectoral or inter-agency in nature that must be overcome. The relocation program must be implemented in order to prevent any possibility of another horizontal conflict in the town of Pontianak. Apart from that, reconciliation can still be achieved through indirect programs such as provision of information, compensation of property lost in Sambas, respect for ethnic Madurese people as they prepare to reclaim their property abandoned

Madurese IDP who had killed a child from the Malay tribe. The ensuing violence left Gelanggang Pangsuma Stadium completely razed by fire.

in Sambas and various other reconciliation programs between families with blood relationships. However, such programs will only be successfully implemented when there is seriousness on the part of government authorities.

There are important concerns about the performance by the bureaucracy in handling IDP problems. First, it is evident that the performance of bureaucrats in responding to the IDP crisis is far from satisfactory. This can be seen from their failure to produce results, their failure to achieve the target of relocating the IDPs, the lack of information about the total number of IDPs and the perpetual recurrence of conflict between IDPs and the local population around temporary camps. The government has also been unable to instill a feeling of security and harmony between the IDPs and the local people. Under such conditions, social strain cannot be ruled out and it continues to haunt both communities. This has the potential to explode at any time in the form of mass violence.

The poor performance by government institutions in addressing IDP problems can also be seen from their lack of coordination and organisation. Between the time that the violence in Sambas began and until it extended into the town of Pontianak on 24 June 2001 — a period of more than two and a half years — an inter-institutional technical team, which was formed by the new government, was handling the victims of the violence in Sambas. However, this team has not been effective because it has not yet conducted any activity except submitting a proposal to carry out the relocation of IDPs.

Second, the government has also often instigated obscure policies that confuse the IDPs. This obscurity is mostly caused by the fact that the government has never actually asked the IDPs about the issues that concern them. In the view of the IDPs, some government officials in fact derive benefits from their existence.

5. Conclusion and policy suggestions

In order to address the IDP problem, a number of steps should be taken including those outlined below.

5.1 Re-count of IDPs

A step that should be taken as a matter of urgency is a total re-count of IDPs, which all IDPs must be informed about beforehand. Registration of IDPs has been carried out before, but it was an ineffective exercise because it did not define the characteristics of IDPs with absolute certainty. The current record of IDPs just takes into account the total number of families in the camps. There is a perception among IDPs that they are being counted for the purposes of the government's IDP project and they therefore endeavour to manipulate the data in order to create as many families as possible. They believe this has budgetary implications regarding the amount of money to be allocated by central government for the IDP project.

Although IDPs have an interest in resorting to such tactics, the government could nevertheless record information about IDPs using basic data from the Sambas district. They could use census or registration data recorded before the conflict. By doing so, the status of every family would be known with certainty. This method would also assist in establishing which families come from conflict areas and which do not, and which families have been created through the manipulation of data and which ones really exist.

5.2 Transparency of information

The local government authorities have attempted to create a flow of information, but it is not yet effective. The information needs of IDPs have not yet been accommodated. The ineffectiveness of the current system often leads to the distortion of information within the community (both local and IDP) and is caused both by those who do it deliberately to gain from such misinformation and by those with no such intentions. As a result, the IDPs do not receive the correct information.

Transparency of the program and the system of funds allocation would not only benefit the IDPs but also the community at large. Through clear information, the possibility of suspicion between groups within the community, particularly between the government, the IDPs and the mediators would be minimised.

5.3 Maintenance of law and order

The maintenance of law and order must employ a humanitarian approach. It is fair to say that the security authorities are faced with a dilemma. This is because the security authorities, like the police, are reluctant to take certain strict security measures. They genuinely fear they will be blamed for human rights violations if they take tough action. However, this attitude of avoiding being directly involved with IDP problems, although understandable, is inexcusable.

For this reason, some kind of compromise is necessary whereby bureaucrats and local community leaders would put their heads together to draw up a concrete agenda, acceptable to all stakeholders, on how best to solve the problem. Creation of a more practical mode of operation, involving all elements within the community, must be urgently undertaken. This approach would have the ability to maintain the delicate balance necessary for coexistence, as no party would feel burdened by tackling the task alone, and no party would feel that the other is avoiding responsibility in handling the IDP problems.

5.4 Promotion of more effective dialogue

Further violence could be prevented through effectively promoting dialogue between key groups; for example, among the IDPs themselves, between IDPs and the local community, between IDPs and local community elders of non-Madurese ethnic origin and between IDPs and bureaucrats. Such dialogue is desirable in order to improve the strained relationship between the IDPs and the local community. At present this relationship is steadily deteriorating, as the locals believe that the IDPs are a liability. The need for this initiative is made even more urgent by the fact that the Pontianak community has very strong feelings of suspicion towards IDPs.

5.5 The role of central government

It is clear that the role of central government is still essential. In spite of the benefits of regional autonomy in terms of political and economic development, local government nevertheless faces significant problems in developing and implementing policy. This is where the central government might have a role in helping local government to establish an appropriate program to solve the problems and to implement it. In addition, since the problems of IDPs affect not only local, but also national, social, political and economic conditions, it is the central government's responsibility to minimise the effects of these problems.

References

- Aditjondro (1994), 'Kata Pengantar', in Stanley: *Seputar Kedung Ombo*, Institute of Community Studies and Advocacy (ELSAM).
- Akil, Mahmud (1994), 'Fenomena Etnisitas di Kalimantan Barat', in Paulus Flores (ed), *Kebudayaan Dayak: Aktualisasi dan Transformasi*, jointly published by LP3S and the Institute of Dayakology Research and Development, Jakarta.
- Alqadrie, Syarif Ibrahim (1999), *Konflik Madura dan Melayu di Kabupaten Sambas*, Pontianak: Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Tanjungpura University, unpublished paper.
- Central Bureau of Statistics (1991), *Penduduk Kalimantan Barat, Hasil Sensus 1990*, Seri S2, Jakarta: Central Bureau of Statistics.
- Central Bureau of Statistics (2001), Jakarta, data supplied to author.
- Centre for Population Studies, Gadjah Mada University (1987), *Analisis Migrasi Penduduk Berdasarkan Data SUPAS 1985 Propinsis Kalimantan Barat*, jointly conducted by the Office of the State Minister for Population and Environmental Affairs and the Centre for Population Studies, Gadjah Mada University, 1987/1988.
- Cernea, M. M. (1990), 'Poverty Risks from Population Displacement in Water Resources Development', Development Discussion Paper No 355, Massachusetts: Harvard Institute for International Development.
- Department of Transmigration and PPH (2001), *Relocation and Resettlement Program for Displaced Persons who are Victims of the Violence in Sambas, Financial Year 2000*, Department of Transmigration and PPH, Regional Office, West Kalimantan Province, Pontianak, 31 July 2001.
- Duffield A. and Young H. (1999), 'Indonesia — Selected Situations', in Duffield, Arabella and Young, Helen (eds), *Report on the Nutrition Situation of Refugees and Displaced Populations*, Geneva: United Nations Administrative Committee on Coordination, Sub-Committee on Nutrition.
- Efendi, Chairil (1999), 'Solusi Tragedi Sambas', *Forum Keadilan*, No. 01, 11 April, p. 38.
- Faculty of Geography and Agriculture, Gadjah Mada University (1979) *Evaluasi Pemantapan Transmigrasi Daerah Bergambut Tebal Rasau Jaya, Kalimantan Barat*, Department of Labor and Transmigration, Directorate General for Transmigration, Final Report from Directorate for Transmigration Preparation Project, p. 48.
- Flores P., Djuweng S., Bamba J. and Andasputra N. (eds) (1994), *Kebudayaan Dayak: Aktualisasi dan Transformasi*, Jakarta: Gramedia Widasarana Indonesia.
- Giddens, Anthony (1993), *Sociology*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Government Province West Kalimantan (2001), *Proposal Program Penanganan Pengungsi Pasca Kekerasan Sosial di Kalimantan Barat*, Pontianak, 12 June.
- The Jakarta Post (2001), 'Nearly 300,000 Displaced in January–August Period', Friday 24 August, p. 1 (no author).
- Kalimantan Review (1999), 'Konflik Dayak-Madura di Kalimantan Barat', *Kalimantan Review*, No. 45, May 1999, p. 16.
- Koentjaraningrat (1988), 'Penelitian Antropologi Terhadap Masalah Komunitas Multiethnic dan Kesatuan Nasional', in Harsja W. Bachtiar, Mely G. Tan, Saparinah Sadii and Muljanto Sumardi (eds), *Komunitas dan Kebudayaan: Kumpulan Karangan untuk Prof. Dr. Selo Soemardjan*, Jakarta: published by Djambatan, pp. 356–357.

- Parjoko, Suryokusumo (1992), 'Masalah Kesatuan dan Persatuan Bangsa di Kalimantan Barat', paper presented at AIPI VIII Seminar in Pontianak, 20-22 January.
- Pemda TK II Kalbar (1988), 'Pola Dasar Pembangunan Daerah Kalimantan Barat', 1989–1994.
- Pemerintah Propinsi Kalimantan Barat (2001), *Proposal Program Penanganan Pengungsi Pasca Kekerasan Sosial di Kalimantan Barat*, Pontianak, 12 June, unpublished document.
- Pusat Penelitian Pembangunan Pedesaan dan Kawasan (1998), *Laporan Akhir Perilaku Kekerasan Kolektif: Kondisi dan Pemicu*, Yogyakarta: Kerjasama antara Pusat Penelitian Pembangunan Pedesaan dan Kawasan Universitas Gadjah Mada dengan Depatemen Agama Republik Indonesia.
- Pusat Studi Kependudukan dan Kebijakan (2000), *Penyusunan Rencana dan Kebijaksanaan Repeta, Propenas, dan Jangka Panjang Transmigrasi dan Kependudukan*, research report, Yogyakarta: Pusat Studi Kependudukan dan Kebijakan dan kantor Menteri Negara Transmigrasi dan Kependudukan.
- Santoso, Amor (1999), 'Orang Madura di Sambas', *Kompas*, 29 March.
- Siahaan, Pulo and Ruth Daroesman (1991), 'West Kalimantan: Uneven development?', in Hal Hill (ed), *Unity and Diversity, Regional Economic Development in Indonesia since 1970*, Singapore: Oxford University Press, pp. 529–548.
- Singarimbun, Masri (1992), 'Hak Ulayat Komunitas Dayak', paper presented at the *National Seminar on Dayak Culture and Ekspo Dayak Culture*, Pontianak, 26-28 November, co-hosted by LP3S - IDR (Institute of Dayakology Research and Development).
- Stanley (1994), *Seputar Kedung Ombo*, published by the Institute of Community Studies and Advocacy (ELSAM) in cooperation with INFID (International NGO Forum on Indonesia Development).
- Yusnono, Y. (1992), 'Peranan Strategis Yang Semestinya Diperankan Dewan Adat', paper presented at the *National Seminar on Dayak Culture and Ekspo Dayak Culture*, Pontianak, 26-28 November, co-hosted by LP3S - IDR (Institute of Dayakology Research and Development).

**An appraisal of the case study on
Forced internal displacement:
the Madurese in West Kalimantan, Indonesia**

Contents

1. Executive summary	42
2. Background to project	42
3. Project objectives	43
4. Methods of appraisal	43
4.1 Primary data	44
4.2 Secondary data	44
5. Findings	44
6. Discussion	46
7. Recommendations and conclusions	47
7.1 Research design	47
7.2 The report	47
7.3 General conclusions	47
7.3.1 Good governance	47
7.3.2 The social cohesion of civil society	48
7.3.3 The health of the population	48
References	49
Appendix	50

1. Executive summary

This appraisal was conducted as a Ford Foundation 'Urgent Research Grant' to CAPSTRANS, University of Wollongong, Australia.

The grant was utilised to appraise an exploratory study on internally displaced persons (IDPs) in West Kalimantan, Indonesia. The study was conducted by the Centre for Population and Policy Studies (CPPS) at Gadjah Mada University in Jogjakarta, Indonesia.

The assignment was successfully undertaken during January-February 2002.

The author recommends this kind of study for situations of conflict where communication breakdown and levels of mistrust, suspicion and trauma have occurred between and across several social groups.

It is recommended that more studies be developed from this exploratory one to develop research in the following areas:

- The effects of evacuation and displacement on the physical and psychological health of IDPs in camps.
- The resettlement and relocation of IDPs who have left camps and started new lives in new areas.
- The effects on and risks to the resident population of a city/area when emergency camps of IDPs are constructed.

2. Background to project

Since the downfall of the New Order in 1998, communal and sectarian conflict has emerged in various parts of Indonesia, especially the Moluccas, Sulawesi and Kalimantan. The reasons given for conflicts in Indonesia are many: ethnic, religious, economic, political, cultural and social. Nevertheless, political instability, due to the rapid succession of governments post-Suharto and the Asian economic crisis of 1997, remain central.

The Indonesian government has been slow and uncoordinated in its response to the various problems. Some of the problems are directly related to the turmoil of the changing structural relationship of the central and local governments with the onset of regional autonomy. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the regions are in danger of being ignored as acceptance of responsibility for them oscillates between the central and local governments. As well, local attitudes favouring the indigenous people of a region and anti-pluralism, in general, are sentiments expressed in the areas of conflict.

The study to be appraised evolved because of the increasing numbers of IDPs throughout Indonesia and the seeming inability of the Indonesian government to deal effectively with conflict situations and their resolution in the era of regional autonomy. In particular, this study looks at the lengthy stay of IDPs in camps and the resultant tensions in the town and district of Pontianak in the province of West Kalimantan. The IDPs are Madurese people who fled their homes amid ethnic violence and conflict which erupted in the Sambas district, West Kalimantan between January and May 1999. The ethnic groups involved in tension and conflict in the Sambas district are the Melayu, Dayak and Madurese. At that time nearly all the Madurese people in Sambas were forcefully removed from their occupied land and business locations to become IDPs in hastily constructed camps in Pontianak town. The town of Pontianak has a broad pluralistic ethnic

composition, including, as well as the above, Chinese, Javanese, Bugis, Batak and Sumatran populations.

The conflict is not religious, as most of the people in the three main groups in conflict are Moslems. This is in contrast to conflicts in other areas of Indonesia, e.g. in Ambon and the Moluccas, or in Poso in Central Sulawesi or briefly in Lombok.

The forced migration has resulted in a number of problems for the IDPs as well as for the population of Pontianak district and town. IDPs have been housed in public amenities, such as the University football stadium, a sports ground and an Asrama. At the time of writing this report, many of them are still in residence there, almost three years later. This is an unacceptable and unexpectedly long time to be living in tough, crowded conditions without conflict resolution, relocation or repatriation.

Conditions are crowded and people are suffering from trauma, unemployment, lack of facilities and lack of purpose. Housing, food and basic amenities, the major concerns for IDPs, have to be organised for them. Issues of reconciliation, relocation and repatriation have yet to be addressed. The people of Pontianak have become increasingly frustrated and angry because their public facilities have been taken over and their leisure pursuits have obviously been curtailed due to the lack of facilities for sports and other recreational activities. This anger is directed towards the government and the IDPs, even though some measure of sympathy was initially forthcoming for the IDPs.

An important factor in the settling of disputes and tensions is relocation. Despite a number of relocation areas being available or released by the government, and a number of IDPs having relocated to some of these areas, there are still issues of distance, costs and amenities which need to be addressed for the large number of IDPs who remain in the camps.

3. Project objectives

The author originally aimed to do fieldwork specifically examining health issues, which was timed simultaneously with the visit to the field by the research team from the Centre for Population and Policy Studies (CPPS) at the University of Gadjah Mada (UGM), Jogjakarta. However, time and financial constraints resulted instead in the author appraising the study carried out by the CPPS team.

The study being appraised was a fieldwork-based exploratory case study of IDPs living in camps. This is a new area of research for the CPPS. At the time of writing, there were no other similar university-based studies to the author's knowledge. The study aimed to assess the situation of IDPs pertaining to Pontianak, West Kalimantan.

The researchers addressed two main questions:

1. What are the problems facing displaced persons and what policies should be undertaken to solve the problems?
2. What are the political, economic, social and cultural obstacles in implementing the policy of handling displaced persons in the regions?

The intended outcomes were to produce a report with findings and recommendations and to release a CPPS Policy Brief to the central and local government authorities. (This is CPPS protocol.)

4. Methods of appraisal

Participatory appraisal was the main method used to collect information regarding the study. In-depth interviews, focused group discussions and library research were the techniques used.

4.1 Primary data

Primary data was obtained from the research team. The author met with and interviewed most of the principal team members involved in the study at CPPS, UGM in Indonesia (see Appendix) from 22–30 January 2002. Data collection took the form of initial general discussions with the group, based on a preliminary draft of the research report, two focused group interviews with the field researchers and one with the team leader, plus several smaller sessions to crosscheck points for clarity.

Contact with members of non-government organisations (NGOs) and individuals involved with IDP programs, as well as political and social commentators, gave broader insights into the IDP situation (see Appendix).

A two-day field trip to Madura Island, the original homeland of Madurese people, gave the author some first-hand knowledge of IDP situations.

4.2 Secondary data

Library research was undertaken of relevant published material on IDPs in Indonesia, ethnic group characteristics and cultures in the conflict areas, as well as political, economic, social and cultural commentaries.

5. Findings

There is documentary evidence of cultural stereotypes for each of the groups involved (Singarimbun 1992, Koentjaraningrat 1988). In Indonesia the general perception of Madurese people is one of marginalisation. They are considered 'tough, hard, and extremely hard-working'. They are known as 'a people who never give up'. If one looks at the long history of Madurese migration to Kalimantan, there have been 'moments' of conflict leading to violence between the Madurese and two of the major ethnic groups — the Dayaks and the Melayu (Kalimantan Review No. 45, May 1999). These have been conflicts between individuals, e.g. a theft or robbery as the result of a breakdown in law and order. On the other hand, there have been intermarriages between these groups as well. Some Madurese consider Kalimantan their homeland and may never have been to the island of Madura, whilst others have visited or were born there but still consider their homes to be in Kalimantan. Others, who were born in Madura, have returned there or to parts of East Java.

Communal violence does not appear to be a feature until 1999. Economic factors, such as the Asian monetary crisis in 1997, exacerbated by socio/political tensions, are significant contributing factors.

The above points may well be the underlying causes of the forced migration from the Sambas district to the district and town of Pontianak. Nevertheless, once evacuated, the problems shift focus to a large extent to tensions between the IDPs in the camps and the multiethnic resident population of Pontianak — as a result of IDP status, and the tensions between civil society and the government authorities. There are a number of tensions between civil society and IDPs, between IDPs and the government and between civil society and the government.

The field research was conducted by two male researchers from CPPS (one qualitative and one quantitative researcher), in conjunction with another male researcher from the University of

Tanjungpura in Pontianak. Together with a guide, the group visited three IDP camps, all within one to three kilometres of the hotel where the Javanese researchers were staying, over a two-week period in August 2001.

The informants that were interviewed consisted of 32 people: 26 men and six women. The informants comprised three different groups of people:

1. IDPs — seven people (two women and five men);
2. Community leaders — eight people (all men); and
3. Government officials — 16 people (four women and 13 men) from the following departments:

- Transmigration
- Public works
- Legislative assembly (local level)
- Social
- Health
- Regional development planning
- Education
- Police
- Information
- Local government

The researchers discovered that IDP camps differ in their reception to outsiders. For example, it was only possible to interview one person from one of the camps because of resistance, hostility, suspicion and sensitivity to the government and outsiders. Three people from each of the other camps were interviewed over several hours. According to the researchers, there is little communication between the camps because the inclinations of the IDPs vary. For example, one camp wishes to follow the government programs, whereas the other two do not.

Many IDPs do not believe what government officials have to say. They consider they speak neither clearly nor forthrightly to them — they are not professional. Government transparency is a significant problem. Relocation areas and/or housing are unsuitable.

The second group, the community leaders are from the three cultural groups involved in conflicts: the Madurese, the Melayu and the Dayak. The researchers could only access the Madurese leaders through the other two groups. These community leaders also expressed concern with the lack of government transparency, the lack of coordination between different departments, the attitude of government officials and the slowness in implementing relocation programs.

The third group, the government officials do not 'believe' the IDPs because two years on some IDPs have now left the camps, bought land and built houses, put their children in schools and so on. This group of IDPs do not wish to be relocated. For others, houses have been built in relocation areas but the IDPs are resisting moving for a variety of reasons.

The researchers observed and noted opinions from all three groups. There are misunderstandings and misinformation between government officials and IDPs about land. According to the researchers, there are different perceptions about land between Dayak groups and the government. Some IDPs want to return to their homeland in Sambas. This is deemed an unlikely prospect, as the other groups in this district, the Dayak and the Melayu, do not want them to return. The land allocated by the government is under dispute, a problem the government appears to be unaware of, although it is widely known by local residents. IDPs do not wish to be relocated to places located a great distance from towns, particularly if communications, roads and transport are poor.

There is confusion amongst IDPs about the amount of compensation money available on an individual family basis. There are other interest groups, corruption, health problems, gambling and prostitution. There are 'local heroes' in the camps who are different from the community leaders, and who may hold different views from the community leaders about the situation in the camps.

A health component was not part of the researchers' brief. Nevertheless, information was on hand and observations were made. The researchers found that at the time the camps were established, a team of health personnel visited each camp and checked the health status of residents. After that, residents were encouraged to visit the nearby health clinic where they could obtain treatment free of charge. Childhood vaccinations were also given at this clinic. On an emotional level, the researchers found the IDPs to be depressed and sensitive. They were also angry, frightened and traumatised by their experiences. There has been no trauma or grief counselling in the camps in Pontianak.

Civilians living in the vicinity of the camps in Pontianak are frightened to go out at night for fear of incidents that might occur and they are angry because their sporting and recreational facilities have been taken away from them. This reached a climax when the camp in the football stadium was burnt down.

6. Discussion

There is no doubt that the situation surrounding and within the IDP camps is difficult and multidimensional in nature. This kind of research — observation, participation and in-depth interviews with individuals, groups and officials from different sides of the situation — exposes and highlights the multidimensional and complex nature of the issues. These methods aim to acknowledge people as subjects rather than objects and/or commodities.

In their report, the research team's findings clearly spell out the areas where problems arise. For example, government accountability, coordination and transparency, issues of corruption in supplying basic amenities, food and housing, different interest groups, public health issues, stress and depression are all major issues.

According to national policies and strategies, it is important that IDPs return to normal life as soon as possible. Constraints to the implementation of this policy seem to be economic resources, reconciliation strategies that have not been addressed adequately and an inadequate or non-existent empowerment period for IDPs to begin a new life. All of these aspects require effort on all sides.

There has been no trauma counselling of IDPs nor, as far as the author is aware, of any of the resident population. There is an urgent need for this, especially amongst IDPs who have suffered the fear and violence of physical conflicts. Based on the author's visit to Madura Island and discussions with NGO workers there, a program for trauma counselling of returned Madurese people has been implemented and appears to have been beneficial. For example, women who were not willing to make friends with neighbours have been brought together and have begun initiating contact with each other. Support people are now based in the communities and can provide information and help relieve stress. This is in line with the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development action program, which states that women, children and the elderly should be protected.

The physical environment of the camps is crowded and unhygienic. These conditions must impact on people's physiological strength and resistance to a number of diseases — malaria, tuberculosis, upper respiratory tract infections and skin problems.

One of the main constraints to the implementation of strategies is the lack of trust and the levels of suspicion between the different groups involved. For the IDPs, there are additional feelings of insecurity and discomfort. They also need to have a means of livelihood available to them. This requires a new, safe place to live where they can get on with their lives in peace and with some stability. Relocation requires suitable land and housing which is not too distant from commercial facilities and/or affordable transportation and basic amenities (McDowell and Cernea 2000).

Reconciliation requires strong positive efforts to be made to set up and continue a dialogue of communication between IDPs and government officials and between both these groups and civil society in Pontianak.

The policies and recommendations of the research team indicate the need for major government changes not only in assessing IDP status, but also in implementation, departmental coordination, transparency and bureaucratic accountability.

7. Recommendations and conclusions

7.1 Research design

This was a useful and straightforward research design eminently suitable for an exploratory study.

7.2 The report

It was recommended to the research team that they include a methodology section in the report.

It was recommended that more ethnographic examples from informants' statements be included for the purpose of contextualising issues.

It was recommended that more information be included about the general characteristics of informants, e.g. age, gender and ethnic group.

It was recommended that more information be included to address more fully the second question posed in the research design.

The research that was conducted is a case study which provides a 'window' into the situation in some IDP camps in one province in Indonesia. This is important in that the methods used to collect data were not invasive, yet the information gained is paramount to understanding the human condition. The author therefore recommends this kind of study for situations of conflict where communication breakdown and levels of mistrust, suspicion and trauma have occurred between and across several social groups.

7.3 General conclusions

At this point in time, the Indonesian government appears to be still struggling with the complex issues surrounding IDPs.

The issues to be addressed for IDPs in Indonesia must include:

7.3.1 Good governance

Government responsibility and accountability and the coordination of departments must be improved. There is clearly a need to establish which people are IDPs and which are not. There must be clear guidelines set in place by the appropriate government bodies and the statistics office for this to happen in an organised and efficient manner.

There must be transparency in the administration of programs. This is an area where the government has attempted to create a system of information, but it has not been put into operation so it cannot be effective. Transparency between the authorities administering the program and the groups within the local community, including IDPs and volunteers, must be a priority so that suspicion and mistrust disappear.

The maintenance of law and order must be humanitarian and must be conducted in a style whereby officers are clear about, understand and feel confident of their duties and any issues of human rights violations. Local community leaders and local bureaucrats should work together to reach solutions to this problem.

7.3.2 The social cohesion of civil society

Peace building and conflict resolution are essential for rebuilding the social cohesion of civil society. Of primary importance is the mending of strained and broken relationships between the different social groups involved — between the Madurese IDPs themselves, between the IDPs and residents of the town and districts of Pontianak and Sambas, between bureaucrats and residents and between bureaucrats and IDPs. Programs must be put in place, with the participation of the various groups and with the aid of outside experienced conciliators and /or NGOs that have undertaken similar projects, to bring about these changes.

7.3.3 The health of the population

Most importantly, the issues of post-traumatic stress syndrome and trauma counselling need urgent attention.

Despite the fact that IDPs have access to a health clinic, the continuing existence of the camps takes its toll on the health of any person living in these conditions.

References

- Kalimantan Review (1999), Konflik Dayak-Madura di Kalimantan Barat, *Kalimantan Review* No. 45, May 1999.
- Koentjariningrat (1988), Penelitian Antropologi Terhadap Masalah Komunitas Multiethnic dan Kesatuan Nasional, in Harsja W. Bachtiar, Mely G. Tan, Sparinah Sadli, Muljanto Sumardi (eds) *Komunitas dan Kebudayaan: Kumpulan Karangan* untuk Prof., Dr. Selo Soemardjan, Jakarta: Djambatan, pp. 356-357.
- McDowell, C. and M. Cernea (2000), *Risks and Reconstruction: Experiences of Refugees and Resettlers*, Washington: World Bank.
- Singarimbun, Masri (1992), Hak Ulayat Komunitas Dayak, paper presented at the National Seminar on Dayak Culture and Ekspo Dayak Culture, 1992, Pontianak, pp. 26-28 November. Co-hosted by LP3S – IDR (Institute of Dayakology Research and Development).
- Toole, M. J. and R.J. Waldman (1997), The Public Health Aspects of Complex Emergencies and Refugee Situations, *Annual Review of Public Health* 18, pp. 283-312.

Appendix

Members of the research team interviewed:

Dr Agus Dwiyanto
Drs Sukamdi
Drs Setiadi
Drs Henry Sembiring

Other individuals and members of non-government organisations interviewed about the conditions of IDPs in Indonesia:

Jakarta:

Imam B. Prasodjo, PhD, Director of Nurani Dunia (NGO)
Ir. Rully N. Amrullah
Vanessa Johanson, Country Director of Common Ground (NGO)
Chusnul Mar'iyah, PhD

Madura:

Bp. Sifbrih Nurani Dunia
Bp. Awaludin Nurani Dunia
Bp. Ali Imron Has, SIP Posantara
Dr Sura Oka, MD IMC Madura Project

Jogjakarta:

Drs Naniek Kusniah, MA, M.MedSc
Triningtyasasih, Medical Anthropologist Rifka Annisa WCC
Dr Gerry Van Klinken, Director ACICIS

Political violence and migration: Recent Acehnese migration to Malaysia

Contents

1. Introduction	52
2. Memories of migration and changes in patterns of mobility	53
3. Recent Acehnese migration to Malaysia	56
4. Political violence and migration	57
4.1 Asylum seekers	57
4.2 Migrant workers	58
4.3 Students	61
4.4 Expatriates	61
5. The migration of politics	62
5.1 Politicisation of the diaspora	62
5.2 Workers and the question of <i>Merdeka</i>	62
5.3 <i>Ulamas</i> and the question of return	63
6. Conclusion	65
References	66

I. Introduction

There are over 500,000 contract workers from Indonesia in Malaysia; in addition, another half a million Indonesians are estimated to be working in the country illegally. In an earlier Ford-funded APMRN study of irregular Indonesian migration to Malaysia (Wong 2002), attention was drawn to the ethnic segmentation of the Indonesian labour market in Malaysia. For illegal migrant workers originating from Indonesia, distinct patterns of migration and migrant behaviour were found between migrant groups from Java and Madura, Lombok and Flores, and Sumatra. This project on recent Acehese migration to Malaysia can be seen as deriving from questions raised by the earlier project.

Acehese respondents in the earlier project tended to make reference to the political and security situation in Aceh as a determining factor in their decision to leave for Malaysia, as well as influencing their decision as to whether, and when, to return. There was also reference to the fact that police were often more lenient with their irregular status, in unofficial recognition of their plight.

It is this political context for migration that forms the point of departure for this study. There is a long history of Acehese migration to the Peninsula, dating back to the 15th century Malacca sultanate, if not earlier. In the colonial era, the establishment of Penang as a major port led to the establishment of a wealthy and influential Acehese trading community in Penang. The Acehese defeat at the hands of the Dutch in the early 20th century also led to a further exodus to Penang and the establishment of a rural community in Yan, Kedah (Reid 1987). Although the flow of people across the Straits from Aceh to Malaysia has never ceased, by the mid-twentieth century, these early Acehese communities in Penang and Kedah had become localised and had lost their character as migrant communities.

It was in the 1970s that a new migrant community of Acehese, located in the Klang Valley⁷, began to emerge. This migrant community, comprised initially of traders, was enriched by the growth in the number of students and labourers in the eighties and nineties. It was also in the 1980s that Kuala Lumpur became the destination of Acehese asylum seekers as well as the place of refuge for activists of Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), the military arm of the Acehese separatist movement.

The study is exploratory in nature. It seeks to explore the dynamics of migration and political violence in the case of recent Acehese migration to Malaysia. In particular, it attempts to explore differences in the form and meaning of migration or mobility in relation to the social background and current occupation of the migrants. Germane to this research question is Siegel's observation that different forms of earlier migrations had quite a different impact on different sections of Acehese rural society. Whereas labour circulation made no difference to the migrant's personality or world-view, the peregrinations of the *ulama*, or religious students, had a profound impact on their self-understanding as well as understanding of the world, and their place in it (Siegel 1969).

Altogether, 29 interviews were conducted in Acehese and transcribed into Malay. There were two types of interviews. The first asked for the family history of the respondent, in particular with respect to the migration history of the family members. Four such interviews were conducted, one each with a respondent from an aristocratic (*bangsawan*), a religious (*ulama*), a trading (*pedagang*) and a peasant (*petani*) background. The second type of interview was focused on the respondents themselves. Questions pertained to family background, migration motives, behavioural and mental

⁷ The term 'Klang Valley' refers to the urban conurbation centred around the capital city of Kuala Lumpur but including a number of other big towns such as Seremban, Shah Alam, Putrajaya and Cyberjaya.

changes, political views and plans for the future. Altogether, 25 such interviews were conducted, with the following distribution: asylum seekers (4), expatriates (2), students (6) and workers (13).

2. Memories of migration and changes in patterns of mobility

Aceh is currently a province of Indonesia with a strong collective memory of a history of political greatness, religious scholarship and anti-colonial rebellion (Chaidar *et al.* 1998). With the discovery and exploitation of large natural gas and petroleum resources on the East Coast of Aceh in the eighties and nineties, it has also become one of the wealthiest provinces, attracting a large number of transmigrants and other workers from other parts of Indonesia, often to the disadvantage, and the disaffection, of the local population.

Aceh's recent political history has been marked by considerable political violence and attendant forced migration, especially in the districts of Aceh Besar, Pidie, Aceh Utara and Aceh Timur. The immediate post-war period of the revolution included the watershed event of the *Perang Cumbok* in 1946, which involved a virtual civil war between the forces of the old aristocracy and the reformist Islamic forces (Reid 1987). The losers in the conflict, the members of the old landed aristocracy, were killed or forced to flee. This event, and the loss as well as dispersion of the family members which it entailed, remains the defining moment in the memory of Acehnese migrants in Malaysia coming from this background.

Relating this event, an informant (from this aristocratic or *bangsawan* background) who has been in Malaysia since 1990 as a student, tells of his grandfather and what happened to his family:

At the time of the Cumbok War, he was in the district of A. A was one of the 12 districts allied together. He was killed, together with his father-in-law, the Raja of the district, and several other male members of the family. Until today, the location of the grave of the Raja of A and those killed with him, including my grandfather, is not known. Of the extensive family of the Raja, only one male member was saved. He was then sixteen. He was brought to safety to Banda Aceh by a close friend of the family ...

The children and the female members of the family also fled to another district with the help of the staff of the Raja ...

All members of the aristocratic families went through tremendous mental pressure as a result of the Perang Cumbok. All the children, male and female, were witness to the brutal killings of their fathers and grandfathers. For example, my father, who eventually moved to Medan to continue his schooling there because he was constantly teased and bullied by his schoolmates ... He eventually settled in another district ...

The trauma of Perang Cumbok always haunted him. And he kept telling me of how he saw with his own eyes the brutal murder of his family members by the PUSA ulama and their helpers. The feeling of hatred toward the PUSA ulama was planted into me since I was small. Similarly, with other members of the aristocracy. This is one example of how the conflict between the aristocracy and the PUSA ulama has continued to the present day ... When DOM was imposed in 1989, one of my relatives, whose father had been killed in the Perang Cumbok, became an informer for Kopassus. Many of those involved in the Perang Cumbok and their family members were killed by Kopassus thanks to him accusing them of being linked to GAM.

Following the end of the *Perang Cumbok*, political conflict and violence broke out again in 1953 with the Darul Islam revolt against the national government of Indonesia, this time led by the PUSA *ulamas* who had defeated the feudal aristocratic forces in the earlier war. This rebellion, and the

migrations it set in train, appears to constitute the defining moment in the collective memory of families steeped in the *ulama* tradition, as in this account of his father by a student who arrived in Malaysia six months ago:

My father is already 80 years old. Let me tell you something about him. He was with the Japanese HEIHO ... At the end of 1945, he joined the People's Peace Army (Tentera Keamanan Raayat), and then the Indonesian Army (TNI) and then, in 1953, like all Achenese, the Darul Islam/TI. That was my father's background as he was with Daud Bereueh. Then in 1966, all the DI/TI forces came down and surrendered. My father was moved to Pekan Baru, but finally, he returned to the kampung and became an Ustaz. But he never returned to Bireun, where he came from. He moved to Bereunun in order to hide his identity as a former DI/TI.

These two accounts show the powerful impact of political violence as a triggering force for mobility across the countryside, and from the countryside to the towns. In the case of the aristocratic families whose seat of power, property and residence had been in their respective 'nanggroe' or domains in the countryside, the violent throes of war and revolution led to a shift in residence from the countryside to the urban centres, within and outside Aceh.

Initially, as in the first account above, families under siege moved to other districts. Eventually, many members of the father's generation moved to Banda Aceh, the capital of Aceh, and to Medan, located outside Aceh, in search of schooling and employment opportunities. For the next generation, Jakarta, as well as destinations outside Indonesia, such as Japan, Europe and Malaysia, appeared on the educational map. Upon return, it was no longer to the original seat of family residence in the countryside, but to an urban centre such as Langsa or Banda Aceh. Interestingly, however, this original seat of family residence is still referred to as the place of origin, as distinguished from the place of birth or place of residence of the individual concerned.

The migration history of such aristocratic families is thus characterised by an abrupt discontinuity. In the colonial period, frequent mobility from district to district occurred in such families as the result of marriages, such as when the paternal grandfather of the respondent above moved to the domain of his father-in-law, or in the event of inheritance, as when his maternal grandfather moved back to take over the office of Raja left vacant when his brother, the Raja, was banished to Batavia for anti-colonial activities. With the *Perang Cumbok* and their subsequent dispossession of life and property, constant mobility became the order of the day, in the general direction of the urban centres of Aceh (Banda Aceh), Sumatra (Medan), Indonesia (Jakarta) and abroad (Malaysia, Australia, Japan, Europe). Hardly anyone returned 'home', to the place of origin or 'heimat'. Some, out of a deep sense of embitterment, never returned to Aceh itself, establishing themselves in other cities in Indonesia or abroad.

The migration history of the *ulama* families in the sample is quite different. As the second account above indicated, the key collective event in the memory of such families is not the *Perang Cumbok* but the *Darul Islam* revolt, which broke out in 1953. The following account of the family history, given by another respondent from an *ulama* family that dates back at least three generations, is instructive. The respondent's paternal grandfather ran a *pondok* in the village of M in North Aceh. This is the story of his father, who received his early religious education in the grandfather's *pondok* as well as formal education in the government primary school. At the age of ten, his father was then sent by his grandfather to a related *pondok* in South Aceh, 600km and four days' travel away, to pursue his religious education. He returned home two years later at the age of twelve, but was immediately sent away again as his father was dissatisfied with his progress. He stayed another five years in this *pondok* in South Aceh before returning back to the *kampung* to assume teaching in the father's *pondok*. Later, he went to East Java to further his religious studies and then to Jakarta. But he was recalled by his father (the respondent's grandfather) to be married to a woman

from Langsa. He then moved to Langsa where his father-in-law provided him with land to build his own *pondok*.

The story here is one of continuity. There is structurally-induced mobility out of the village, but within the framework of a well-mapped topography of rural religious institutions. For the next generation, the availability of a formal system of religious education is highly evident. The respondent himself received his early religious education in his father's *pondok* in Langsa, and proceeded to the government religious school in Langsa before leaving at the age of 19 for a *pondok* owned by a family member in North Aceh. After a year, he returned to teach at his father's *pondok*. Two years later, he left for Mecca, and proceeded to the Al-Azhar where he spent three years doing a degree in Arab literature. Upon his return, he became a lecturer at a religious tertiary institute, IAIN, in Banda Aceh. He subsequently acquired a higher degree at the Faculty of Religion of a university in Malaysia and is currently pursuing a higher degree there.

The formalisation of a religious school system has provided fresh avenues of educational and geographical mobility for a tradition of mobility in such families, but a sense of continuity remains. The topography has been extended, it has not been replaced. Practices of migration, though, have been subject to change, such as the age at which migration takes place. It remains to be seen what implications such changes in migration practice will have.

For two other social groups in Acehnese society, however, the traders and peasants, the tradition of migration has been quite different from that of the political and religious elites. To begin with, political events, such as the *Perang Cumbok* and the Darul Islam revolt, appear to have been far less intrusive in the lives of such families. Furthermore, for the peasant family, the practice of marriage migration so frequently encountered in the narratives of the *bangsawan* and *ulama* families above did not occur, as village endogamy was the common practice.

In the migration history obtained from a respondent from a peasant background, both his parents came from the same village, as did his grandparents. His grandfather had never left the village; neither had his parents, nor any family member from their generation. It is only in the generation of the respondent that family members have begun to leave the village for working stints in other villages. A cousin went to work in Sabang, some 400km away, before returning to marry in the village. Another cousin worked in Cot Girek, some 10km away, before returning to the village. Other cousins have worked in Perlak and in Malaysia. All have returned to the village. The respondent himself left for Malaysia, a year after his identity as an informant for GAM in his village was uncovered.

This picture of relative immobility in the Acehnese countryside in the post-war period is not shared by the account given by a respondent from a trading background. His grandfather was a spice trader from Pakistan who settled in the town of Lhokseumawe in North Aceh, whilst his brother, with whom he had travelled from Pakistan, settled in Penang. The trade in spice was conducted with Medan and Penang, but his grandfather did not travel himself although the goods did. He never attempted to expand the volume of the business, nor its geographical spread, and remained in the same town till the end of his days.

It was the grandfather's three sons, the respondent's uncles and father, who moved to Medan and succeeded in expanding their business from there to Hong Kong, Singapore and Penang — exporting coffee and rubber in addition to spices. They travelled frequently to these other ports, and one of the brothers also spent several years in Hong Kong running the business. Another, the father of the respondent, lived in Singapore for several years, and made frequent visits to Penang. Another brother established a business in Jakarta.

In the generation of the respondent, the trans-national trading network declined. Business activities, including new goods such as the sale of video cassettes, became more focused on the local and

national market, centred in towns like Medan, Banda Aceh and Jakarta. In this third generation, educational mobility also sees the extension of geographical mobility to Bandung, Java, Australia and Malaysia. The respondent came to further his education in Malaysia two years ago, with the intention also of strengthening ties to the Penang relatives.

Clearly, apart from the precipitating force of political conflict and flight, the development of trading, labour and educational networks have been 'long duree' forces that have contributed to specific patterns of migration as well as the spread of geographical mobility to larger sections of the population in Aceh in more recent years. We shall now turn our attention to the specific history of the recent migration of Acehnese to Malaysia.

3. Recent Acehnese migration to Malaysia

In 1976 political violence erupted again in the district of Pidie in Aceh, with fighting initiated by the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) led by Teungku Hasan di Tiro in a bid to wrest *Merdeka* or independence from the state of Indonesia. The fighting was largely confined to the districts of Pidie, North Aceh and East Aceh, where the Darul Islam rebellion of 1953, the *Perang Cumbok*, as well as the earlier anti-colonial war against the Dutch were largely fought. By 1979, the rebellion was crushed and Teungku Hasan and his supporters fled the country.

After a brief stopover in Singapore and Malaysia, Teungku Hasan and some members of the senior leadership of the movement went into exile in Sweden. Many others remained in Malaysia and worked as labourers in the booming construction sector in the Klang Valley, along with other labour migrants from Aceh who were not political refugees. The GAM political refugees then constituted a small minority amongst the Acehnese labour migrant population but took the opportunity to make new recruits amongst the incoming migrants.

This new Acehnese influx of labour migrants and political refugees, who became labour migrants in the Klang Valley in the early 1980s, was accompanied by the concurrent immigration of traders who established themselves in the Chow Kit neighbourhood (soon to be known as 'Little Jakarta') in Kuala Lumpur. They served the needs of the burgeoning Indonesian migrant community by selling (smuggled) goods from Indonesia such as cigarettes, medicine, foodstuffs and so on. Some of the businesses were of a sizeable scale, and established with capital brought over from Indonesia. In addition to these big Acehnese businesses, Acehnese migrants soon established petty trading with capital saved from their work as casual labourers.

The emerging Acehnese community of workers, political refugees and big and small traders, many of whom came from the countryside and may have entered the country under irregular circumstances, found it easy then to regularise their status through the acquisition of permanent residence (Wong 2002). The slow but steady growth of this community throughout the 1980s was thus largely induced by economic forces.

In mid-1989, GAM military activities re-surfaced in Aceh. Libyan support in the mid-1980s, in the provision of training (for activists recruited in part from Malaysia) as well as of arms, was helpful in this respect (Chaidar 1998). With the outbreak of fighting in Aceh in 1989, again largely in the districts of Pidie, North Aceh and East Aceh, Aceh entered into the era of DOM (*Daerah Operasi Militer* or Military Operations Area) imposed by President Suharto. This ended ten years later, with the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998. During this ten-year period, the level of violence escalated to a hitherto unknown degree.

The outbreak of fighting provoked renewed flight in 1989 to the nearby port of Penang, which could be reached by small boats and barter vessels. About 600 such refugees, the majority of whom were family members of GAM members, were detained in Penang by the Malaysian authorities, who

charged them with illegal entry into the country. In 1990, at the height of military sweeping operations, waves of young men from the affected villages made their way, mostly to the Klang Valley. After the ebbing of the 1990 tide, another major flow occurred in 1994, when intense military pressure forced GAM fighters themselves to flee, many of them with their families, to the Klang Valley. Many of them turned to trading to earn their living.

Apart from the labour migrants and the GAM fighters, the 1990s also saw the entry of Acehnese into the institutions of higher learning in Malaysia, beginning in 1991 with an intake of students into the International Islamic University. Unlike the other young migrants who came from the villages and small towns in the countryside that were the scene of battle and insecurity, the students came from the urban centres which had, throughout the DOM period, remained totally unaffected by the violence. Their departure was hence non-political in character. Their numbers increased steadily throughout the 1990s and there are today an estimated 400 Acehnese students in various institutions of higher learning in Malaysia.

The removal of DOM in 1999 permitted the resurrection of GAM military activity. In a daring action, seven soldiers were killed in North Aceh, leading to another cycle of violence and counter-violence. Whereas the earlier GAM rebellions in 1976 and 1989 had met with little societal support and were largely confined to the affected villages and small towns of the districts of Pidie, North Aceh and East Aceh, the situation today is quite different.

With the removal of DOM and the democratisation of the political culture instituted by the *reformasi* movement in Indonesia, the abuses of the DOM period became widely known, especially to the urban citizenry. The cause of Aceh was now embraced by larger segments of society, representing social forces and political positions other than that of GAM. University students, the *ulama*, students from the *pondoks* and NGOs entered into the fray. The military presence of GAM itself was also strengthened. Faced with this upsurge in civil and military opposition, the Indonesian government resorted to even greater violence.

BRIMOB (the *Brigad Mobil* or Mobile Police Brigade) was brought in to deal with a vastly strengthened GAM. The resultant situation has been a nightmare for the general population. In the wake of these developments, 1999 saw large-scale internal displacements of Acehnese villagers, as well as those of Javanese and other ethnic origin, who felt or who were threatened by the increasing Acehnese militancy. Many have left for Medan and Jakarta. Increasingly, they are going to Malaysia.

The number of Acehnese in Malaysia today is estimated to be around 7,000, which is several thousand more than a few years ago. The majority of the recent arrivals are *kampung* and small-town youth (largely male) of peasant background who enter the casual labour market in the Klang Valley. There are also asylum seekers, students and expatriates, some of whom also look for jobs in the labour market there. In the next section, a closer look will be taken at the reasons for, and experience of, their migration.

4. Political violence and migration

Of the 25 Acehnese migrants interviewed in Kuala Lumpur, four were asylum seekers, 13 were workers, six were students and two were expatriates. The asylum seekers were clearly those whose reasons for leaving the country were the most closely linked to political violence.

4.1 Asylum seekers

Respondent 8 had just arrived in Kuala Lumpur a month earlier and was awaiting his interview with the UNHCR to determine his refugee status. He told his story:

My wife was threatened by the aparat⁸. At that time, I wasn't home. Because before that, on 23 June 2001, my neighbour was detained. He is 20. Under interrogation, he claimed that a HT found on him was mine. At that time, I was in Jakarta, but he said that I had just gone to the river to relieve myself. He was brought to the security post in Cot Girek and there, under further interrogation, he told them I had an M-16. After that, the aparat came to the house everyday. My wife phoned me to tell me they were looking for me. The Commando Unit Rajawali from Java and the Unit 112 from Aceh. They came with 20 men. So when I returned from Jakarta, I did not go home, I hid somewhere which was close to my home. I'm actually a volunteer with Solidaritas Persaudaraan Korban Pelanggaran HAM Aceh. My job was to monitor abuses by the Indonesian military of the civil population.

I telephoned KOLAKOP (Komando Wilayah Keamanan dan Operasi) Aceh Utara and said, 'This time you dare to look for people who don't carry weapons. I'm from the civil sector and do not have any ties to GAM, when you detained the boy next to my house, I wasn't home.' He asked me to surrender myself to him, but I thought, since I had not done anything wrong, why should I surrender?

I am very angry with the attitude of the Indonesian military in Aceh. They are currently chasing all the Aceh activists out of the country so that they can do what they wish with the civilians in Aceh. If volunteers or activists are not there in Aceh, they can do anything they wish. The news of their actions will not be taken up, or will be suppressed. So, on 21 September at nine in the morning about 15 Indonesian military personnel came to my house. They looked for me, but I was not there. My wife was detained, and my child as well. Then they took 2 litres of oil from my house. They didn't burn my house that morning. But they returned at 4 am the next morning, and set it on fire. At that time, my wife had been released and was at home. She ran away from the back of the house with the children and sought the help of a neighbour with a car to get to my brother's house in Kuala Simpang. I only met up with her the next day in Matang Kuli. After that I tried to contact the Japanese NGO. I told them, 'I wish to ask for asylum outside of the country, because of pressure from the Indonesian military.' So they sponsored my coming here.

All four asylum seekers had either been detained before or were fearful of detention. They could show proof of ties with GAM or with NGOs and were issued with UNHCR identification documents. It should be noted that Malaysia does not accord refugee status as it is not a signatory to the 1951 United Nations Convention on Refugees, generally known as the Geneva Convention. Asylum seekers accorded mandated UN refugee status by the UNHCR office in Kuala Lumpur are allowed temporary residence in Malaysia until resettlement in a third country.

4.2 Migrant workers

Of the 13 workers interviewed, two were working in Province Wellesley in the north and the remainder in different sites in the Klang Valley. It is noteworthy that the two informants in Province Wellesley had been in the country for a longer period of time, four and five years respectively. Their reasons for coming to Malaysia were those of classical labour migrants, unrelated to political violence.

⁸ Term used to refer to Indonesian security forces, whether military or police.

Respondent 25, for example, a 31 year-old male with a high school education from Langsa, who comes from an aristocratic or *bangsawan* family and has been working as a construction worker in Province Wellesley for the past five years, had this to say when asked the reason for his migration to Malaysia:

I used to help my father in his office. He was a contractor for buildings and roads, and received contracts from the government. He went bankrupt five years ago, that is why I came to Malaysia.⁹ I don't have any higher education, so when my father went bankrupt, I worried about what kind of job I could get. At that time, it wasn't easy to look for a job in Langsa. So I thought hard, and thought that it might be a good idea to go to Malaysia. Because I had heard from friends who had returned from Malaysia that work there was easy to find. If you were willing to work, you could save money. I spoke to my parents and thank God, they agreed.

In the same vein, Respondent 24, a 32 year-old graduate from a religious high school who used to work in the district office of a small town in East Aceh:

At that time, I was working for the government. The salary was very small, not even enough for one person. Don't talk of helping the parents, even feeding myself was difficult ... so I decided to come to Malaysia ... No, there were no other reasons. At that time, although it was during DOM, nothing was felt at AN. Before, where it was bad was in the villages of Pidie and North Aceh. In East Aceh, if there was anything, it was in Perlak. I myself never saw any evidence of DOM in Aceh. I became aware of what happened during DOM only after I read reports of it in the papers. I was really shocked. Because at that time, life in my village was normal, like always, nothing special happening. But what is clear is that what the sipai¹⁰ did to the people of Aceh was terrible. Worse than the work of demons.

The decision to move to Province Wellesley four or five years ago in search of work, not refuge, is likely to have been taken within the context of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, which crippled the Indonesian economy. As Respondent 24 reaffirmed, the political violence of DOM was confined to a few districts and news of it was generally kept under a tight lid. Thus it had no bearing on their decision.

This is in striking contrast to the narratives of the younger workers interviewed in the Klang Valley who, almost without exception, left Aceh in the past year. Respondent 23, 24 years of age, from a peasant family in North Aceh:

I don't know why but I was accused of belonging to GAM. I was stopped on the road. At the time, I was returning from a shop in Matang Kuli. By chance there was a 'sweeping' exercise. They stopped me and without asking, I was kicked. They hit me on the road and then brought me to their post, and asked me all sorts of questions. They kept me for two hours. Then my village head came and got me out. They let me go, but said that I had to report to the police every day. And then my father told me to come to Malaysia.

Respondent 17, a 26 year-old from a village in North Aceh who has been working as an illegal immigrant in the Klang Valley for nine months:

⁹ That was the time of the Asian Financial Crisis.

¹⁰ Colloquial term used to refer to Indonesian military and police.

My father was killed in the crossfire on his way to his padi field (sawah). They don't care who they shoot in a war, they just sweep all they can get. After that, they burnt the houses of the villagers, so I came here to look for wages (rezeki) to send home to my family. For my mother, and for my brothers and sisters who are still in school. To pay for their fees.

Respondent 15, a 22 year-old from Pidie who operated a small business in his village before coming here eleven months ago:

The village is no longer a good place to live in. There's conflict in Aceh now, so it's become difficult. Looking for work is also difficult. And then my shop was burnt. There was a shootout between GAM and the Indonesian military. After that, TNI burnt the houses and shops of the villagers. That was when I decided to leave for Malaysia. It's impossible to live in Aceh now. You can't find work. A small mistake and you are kicked.

This picture of village life tormented by constant military harassment and wanton destruction of life and property, and dogged by lack of employment, is also given by Respondent 16:

The soldiers live next to my house. When we leave, they question, when we return, they question. Almost every day it is like that. And then, everyday I see villagers being kicked, maybe because they gave the wrong answers. I thought, rather than be kicked, better to go to Malaysia...

and Respondent 14:

In the village there is no work. In the village, there is no security. Even when I returned, my father told me to go away quickly, because there is no peace. The Indonesian soldiers are difficult, they enter the village and just beat people up. After that, if there are young healthy people, they are taken away. Many young people from my village have never returned.

Respondent 1, a 26 year-old who arrived just two months ago, put it in even stronger terms:

Conditions in the village are such that I can't take it anymore. It's now getting worse. Our lives have no value anymore. Like the life of an animal. Every day the sipai conduct 'sweeping' exercises. When they enter a house or a shop, they behave outrageously. Whatever they want, they take. If we give a wrong answer, we get kicked, if not hit by an M-16. I see many young people and villagers treated like that. Sometimes, they just fool around with their weapons. They are very brutal.

Such conditions, directed in particular at the young village males, obviously also affect the economic livelihood of older adults. Respondent 22, who is 46 years of age, sold his pedicab and left his home town for Malaysia a year ago because the insecure conditions were keeping people off the streets and hence hurting his business. Similarly, Respondent 13, a 37 year-old market gardener and prawn grower, gave up his business and moved to Malaysia two years ago because the constant road blocks were preventing his produce from getting to the markets on time.

The last of the 11 respondents who were working illegally in the Klang Valley is a 32 year-old with a degree in law from Banda Aceh, the capital of Aceh. He was running a shop selling shoes before coming to Malaysia six months ago. His story is one of political harassment as well:

I thought of coming to Malaysia because I felt threatened in Banda Aceh. At that time, the situation was 'hot'. They were always conducting sweeping exercises in the

shops. When they came, I had to serve them well, otherwise there would be trouble. There were always students in my shop. In the end, this made the police suspicious. They thought they were planning anti-government activities. One day they came to my shop and looked for me. By chance I wasn't there. I was in Medan. My brother was in the shop and when I returned, he told me to be careful. I left again immediately for Medan, and only returned again two weeks later. My brother told me they were still looking for me. That was when I decided that I had to leave Banda Aceh.

In contrast to the two migrant workers who had come four or five years ago, all eleven migrant workers who had arrived in the last year (one came two years ago) made reference to the condition of political violence in their immediate surroundings, which either threatened their lives or their livelihoods, and their peace of mind.

4.3 Students

Of the six students interviewed, four were pursuing masters degrees and two PhDs at Universiti Putra Malaysia (UPM), Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM), Universiti Malaya (UM) and Malaysian Multimedia University (MMU). For the two PhD students, both of whom were in their thirties and married with families, the decision to pursue their studies in a Malaysian university had little to do with the condition of political violence in their country. The move was a career move, facilitated by the fact that tertiary education in Malaysia is relatively inexpensive compared to other foreign countries, whilst of higher quality in terms of infrastructure and access to staff and research jobs than universities in Aceh.

To a large extent, this was also true of the students pursuing their masters degrees. The quality of the education available in Malaysia, as well as the possibility of financing the education through the availability of research assistantships and other odd jobs, were mentioned by all as having influenced their decision to pursue their studies in Malaysia. All four, however, also made reference to the current political situation as having had a bearing on their decision. Three, who had been students in Banda Aceh, had been more or less active in student protests and demonstrations in conjunction with the student movement in 1998 for a referendum on the future of Aceh.

The fourth had taken his first degree in a university in Jakarta and upon his return to Medan, had considered going to the Middle East as a contract worker before deciding to pursue his masters in Malaysia. The reasons he gave for wanting to leave:

Oh because in Indonesia now it is difficult to look for jobs, the economy is weak, any kind of work is difficult to get. Returning to the village is also difficult because it is not safe there. A carefree life is gone. And then, there are certain quarters who are muddying the atmosphere in Aceh. Every day, people come to the house asking for money, from which quarter we don't know. Only thing that is certain is that life is no longer safe. 'Sweeping' is done almost every day by the military. Fortunately, nothing has happened so far, but if things go wrong, for no reason you get kicked. So I thought, better to study in Malaysia.

4.4 Expatriates

Two Achenese were teaching at institutions of higher learning in Malaysia. One had done a higher degree at a Malaysian university and through the good offices of his professor had been offered his present position. He has been in Malaysia for seven years. The other, also from the engineering sciences, had received his PhD in France, and had assumed his contract a year ago. For them, even more than for the students, the move to Malaysia was purely a career move.

5. The migration of politics

In this exploration of the migration of politics, three main observations will be made. First, a high level of political consciousness and interest exists in the migrant community in Kuala Lumpur, in part appearing to derive from the politics of diaspora. Second, the political option of Acehese separatism is most strongly supported by the migrant workers, as against students and expatriates. Third, the most profound level of political commitment is to be found amongst those of an *ulama* background.

5.1 Politicisation of the diaspora

Notwithstanding the non-political character of the migration of the students and expatriates (and labour migrants), without exception, all 25 respondents expressed a deep concern and a keen interest in developments in Aceh. The least inclined to give expression to their political views were the expatriates; both expatriates refused to comment on what form of political future they desired for Aceh. Asked about their aim in coming to Malaysia, however, one said: 'My aim was to get my PhD, gain experience, and after that, return to Aceh. Serve in Aceh and die in Aceh.' The other said something similar. His aims were threefold: first, to raise his professional standing, second, to sharpen his capacity for research and third, 'To try to adapt whatever knowledge I acquire here to develop Aceh.'

Almost without exception as well, all respondents reported that they kept in close touch with news from home and Aceh. For the educated, the frequent reference to the Internet as a source of news — through email as well as websites — was striking. Workers referred to newsletters (a weekly newsletter on the latest developments in Aceh, published in Malaysia, is widely available in areas where Acehese migrants congregate), as well as to news brought by recent arrivals from Aceh.

In fact, the conjunction of Acehese from various backgrounds (socio-economic as well as geographical) living under difficult conditions in Malaysia appears to have facilitated the exchange of information and solidarity between what has been argued to be a highly segmented and disunited society (Siegel 1969). As Respondent 24 said (see above), he had not known about the excesses of DOM until he went to Malaysia and read and heard about it — from friends on the same construction site.

The experience of being confronted with another society also appears to have heightened the sense of Acehese nationalism, as seen in Respondent 8's reflections:

When I arrived in Malaysia, I was very envious to see the conditions here. They can fast in comfort, they can live in comfort and peace. Not like us in Aceh ... If Aceh were like Malaysia, our prosperity would be even more. Because we are richer in natural resources, if we were independent (Merdeka), we could build something even better than the Petronas Twin Towers.

New rifts have also developed in the diaspora, in particular, political rifts. Respondent 8 referred to those in the diaspora who are no longer concerned with the struggles of the homeland.

A small number of Acehese no longer think of Aceh as their homeland. Many of those who had the chance to live better here now try to destroy Aceh. This group is mainly to be found among the traders. But for the majority of the Acehese here, that is at the level of the workers, the commitment to Aceh is still high.

5.2 Workers and the question of *Merdeka*

Only 12 of the 25 respondents spoke clearly in favour of *Merdeka* or independence from Indonesia, and interestingly, with the exception of two asylum seekers, one of whom is quoted above, they were all irregular workers. Their sentiments were strong and simple.

For me, if possible, let Aceh get Merdeka soon. The longer Aceh is under the sipai-Jawa, the worse it will get. When I saw the Javanese beating up Acehnese, I felt like strangling them. (Respondent 1)

For me, I'll choose Merdeka. If they give NAD or autonomy, it's all fraud. If they won't give, we'll have to work for it. Fight. Expel them. (Respondent 10)

We pray if possible for Merdeka tomorrow. If our aim is not Merdeka, what's the point of the struggle. (Respondent 13)

For me, I want Aceh to get Merdeka quickly. (Respondent 14)

If possible, Merdeka tomorrow. (Respondent 15)

I want Aceh Merdeka. No more ties with Indonesia. (Respondent 18)

When I see that, I get prejudiced. The sipai are really evil. For me, if possible, Aceh to be Merdeka tomorrow. (Respondent 22)

I want Aceh to be Merdeka. Free from the hands of the Indon. (Respondent 23)

I'm not really interested in politics. I don't understand politics. But as an Acehnese, I prefer Aceh to be Merdeka rather than be under the accursed Indonesian government. (Respondent 24)

Of course, Merdeka. What else. I think not a single Acehnese does not want Merdeka, except for the spies and traitors. (Respondent 25)

As indicated in two of the above statements, the strong sentiments underlying this political position among the workers — all of whom, with one exception, came from a peasant or petty trading background — probably had to do with their direct experience of police or military brutality, in contrast to the experience of the urban-educated middle class.

It should be noted that GAM has been actively campaigning among the workers. In fact, most of the workers would be contributing a monthly payment of five or ten ringgit to GAM. This financial support, according to a number of the respondents, is given freely and with 'an open heart'. As Respondent 17 said:

We can't just enjoy an easy life here. There, they are sacrificing their lives. But my friends and I always contribute for them. We have sympathy for them. So it's only fair, here we work and provide contributions, so that they can fight there.

5.3 *Ulamas* and the question of return

The question of return — if and when — was posed to every respondent. For those in Malaysia as workers, there were two basic types of responses: return when conditions in Aceh have improved or return when enough money has been saved — to buy a new *beca*, or set up a business, as the

case may be. The one migrant worker here with a legal contract (Respondent 15) was the only one with a clear time horizon: 'When the contract is over in a year and a half, I'll return to the village.'

For the others, the temporal horizon was conditional. 'Enough money to return, I'll return straight away,' as Respondent 13 said. The other position made return conditional on the security situation in Aceh: 'Wait till it's safer, then I'll return.' (Respondent 18) Without exception, however, all those working in Malaysia said they would return. 'Of course. Aceh is my home (*kampung*), isn't it. Why should I stay here?' (Respondent 25)

For the asylum seekers, the situation is much more complex, given the conditions of that legal status. The accordance of UN-mandated refugee status means the possibility of resettlement in a third country, invariably in the West. It also means the surrender of their Indonesian passport. On the other hand, remaining in Malaysia is not possible, as UN refugee status is not recognised in Malaysia. The decision as to which country they will eventually be resettled in is out of their hands. 'I don't know — depends on the UN.' This was said by Respondent 9, who in fact would have preferred to have received asylum in Malaysia if he could: 'If they allow me to stay in Malaysia, I would stay in Malaysia — it's better here, and easier for me to keep in touch with my home (*kampung*). If it's possible here, why go to a country which is far away.'

It is for the students and expatriates that the option remains open. Respondent 21, aged 34, a masters engineering student from Banda Aceh, where his father is a contractor, and who did his first degree in engineering in Surabaya, took a 'wait and see' attitude.

Ya, I will see how things work out, if it is good for me, I will try it out for a few years, don't really know, what is important is that I work toward becoming a professional lecturer.

Respondent 2, aged 38, a lecturer at a university in Banda Aceh on leave of absence to pursue a PhD in engineering in Malaysia, would like to return, but is uncertain when.

No. I love Aceh very much. But in the present situation, I don't think I can return to teach in Aceh. Maybe later, when the situation has improved. This isn't an economic, but a safety consideration. As far as living is concerned, it is sweeter in Aceh than here. That is how I see it.

Similarly, Respondent 11, a 42-year old expatriate teaching at the Faculty of Engineering in a university in Malaysia:

If I look at the situation now, maybe two years won't be enough for me here. Maybe more than two years, four, five years maybe. So I'll be here for six years. That's the maximum. Because I'm afraid that I might otherwise forget my original aim.

For one student, doing his MBA at a private university in Malaysia after completing his first degree in economics in Jakarta, the answer is clear — not to return. 'My plan is to settle and work here.' (Respondent 4) For another younger group of students from a different social background, the response was quite different. Respondent 3 says firmly: 'I will finish my studies as quickly as possible, and then return to my home village to serve there.' When asked what he would do if the present conditions were still to prevail, he said, 'I will definitely return, even if the situation is troubled and unsafe in Aceh.' In a similar vein, Respondent 7 replies:

Whatever happens, I will return to Aceh. That is the land of my ancestors. Therefore, wherever I happen to be, I am bound to remember that place, and I have to return, especially in order to realise my dream of establishing an educational foundation for the children of Aceh.

Respondents 3 and 7 are both fresh graduates of IAIN (Institute of Islamic Higher Education) in Banda Aceh. Respondent 3 is now studying at the Faculty of Islam and Respondent 7 at the Faculty of Political Science in universities in the Klang Valley. Both come from deeply religious *ulama* families, with family-run *balee* or *pondoks*, where village children are taught to read the Koran. Both were student activists whilst at IAIN.

It is interesting to note that not only is there the firm desire and intention to return to Aceh regardless of the political situation, but the return is, at least in the case of Respondent 3, to the home village. Furthermore, in both cases, the return is also seen in politico-religious terms, as indeed, is the act of migration itself. Respondent 7 refers to his coming to Malaysia as *berhijrah*. *Hijrah* in the Islamic grand narrative refers to the flight of the Prophet Mohamed from Mecca to Medina, in order later to return to take Mecca.

6. Conclusion

This preliminary study has attempted to look at recent Acehnese migration to Malaysia within the context of the current political conflict in Aceh, as well as taking into consideration the complex socio-historical forces which have shaped the migration patterns of Acehnese society. It has tried, in particular, to go beyond the socio-demographic and economic examination of what is generally seen to be a group of irregular immigrants in Malaysia to explore the meaning of migration for those who undergo the experience.

Clearly, some of the findings of this study have policy implications for the region. Political violence has been shown to be an important underlying factor for the decision to migrate for a large number of Acehnese, but in the absence of a refugee policy in Malaysia — asylum is only accorded by the UNHCR for resettlement in third countries — these migrants remain in Malaysia as illegal workers and face the risk of deportation if caught. The migration of politics, as well as the politics of return, raise important questions about the development of transnational networks of political activism in the region.

Finally, as Malaysia moves towards trying to reduce its dependence on Indonesian workers, both legal and illegal, migrants fleeing from political violence, such as the Acehnese, may find themselves trapped in an intolerable situation. These are some of the issues that this report has highlighted which need urgent policy attention.

References

- Al Chaidar, Sayed Mudhahar Ahmad dan Yarmen Dinamika (1998), *Aceh Bersimbah Darah: Mengungkap Status Penerapan Daerah Operasi Militer (DOM) di Aceh 1989 – 1998*, Jakarta: Pustaka Darul Falah.
- Reid, Anthony (1987), *Perjuangan Rakyat: Revolusi dan Hancurnya Kerajaan di Sumatra*, Jakarta: Sinar Harapan.
- Siegel, James (1972), *The Rope of God*, Massachusetts: University of California Press.
- Wong, Diana and Teuku, Afrisal (2002), *Migran Gelap*. Indonesian migrants into Malaysia's Shadow Economy, unpublished manuscript, submitted to Scalabrini Migration Center: Manila.